Pro Se Bar in Federal Wrongful-Death Litigation: A Non-Lawyer Spouse/Personal Representative Cannot Litigate When Other Statutory Beneficiaries May Share the Claim

Introduction

In Jelena Todorovic Clemente v. Anna Koget (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2026) (non-precedential), Jelena Todorovic Clemente, proceeding pro se, sued multiple physicians and healthcare entities in federal court (diversity jurisdiction) asserting Pennsylvania wrongful-death and vicarious-liability theories arising from her husband’s March 2022 death following cancer treatment. The central procedural issue was not medical causation, but whether Clemente— a non-attorney spouse and personal representative—could prosecute a wrongful-death case in federal court without counsel when other potential wrongful-death beneficiaries (the decedent’s children) might share in any recovery.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Clemente’s third amended complaint. While the Court noted the District Court “conflated” estate beneficiaries with wrongful death beneficiaries, the outcome remained the same: because a Pennsylvania wrongful-death action is prosecuted for the benefit of all persons entitled to recover under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301(b)—potentially including surviving children—a non-lawyer plaintiff cannot proceed pro se in federal court where other beneficiaries’ interests are implicated. The dismissal was with prejudice as to Clemente proceeding pro se, and without prejudice to refiling through counsel on behalf of the proper interests.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014)
Provided the appellate standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal (de novo; accept well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences for the plaintiff). It framed how the Third Circuit evaluated whether the pleadings could plausibly support Clemente’s ability to litigate pro se.
Murray ex rel. Purnell v. City of Phila., 901 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2018)
This was the opinion’s cornerstone on pro se representation limits: “a non-attorney may not represent other parties in federal court.” The Court relied on Murray for the estate context: a “non-attorney administrator of an estate” cannot represent the interests of beneficiaries other than herself. The present panel extended the same logic to the wrongful-death context once it clarified that wrongful-death beneficiaries may include persons beyond the pro se litigant.
Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1991)
Reinforced the categorical federal rule that a non-lawyer may not act as counsel for others (there, children). It supported the general principle applied here: when the case necessarily affects rights belonging to others, pro se litigation is barred.
Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490 (Pa. 2016) (quoting Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013))
These Pennsylvania authorities supplied the key substantive clarification the Third Circuit used to correct the District Court’s framing: a wrongful-death claim is brought by specified relatives “to recover damages on their own behalf, and not as beneficiaries of the estate.” That distinction mattered because Clemente tried to solve the pro se problem by removing the estate and obtaining a disclaimer from one child; the Third Circuit explained that estate disclaimers do not necessarily eliminate wrongful-death beneficiary interests.
Tulewicz v. SEPTA, 606 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1992)
Supplied two essential features of Pennsylvania wrongful-death procedure that drove the pro se conclusion: (1) after six months, an eligible person may sue “as trustee ad litem on behalf of all persons entitled to share in the damages,” and (2) wrongful-death claims cannot be prosecuted piecemeal—one action proceeds in the collective interest and bars other wrongful-death actions. Because the plaintiff effectively litigates for everyone entitled to share, a non-lawyer cannot do so in federal court.
Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964) and Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (1804)
Used to explain executor/administrator terminology and why “personal representative” status does not change the pro se analysis when other persons’ rights are involved.
Miller v. Phila. Geriatric Ctr., 463 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2006)
Cited to rebut Clemente’s attempt to recast her damages as “personal property tort claims” (tractor/farm income). The Court characterized her asserted lost income from her husband’s hay sales as a classic pecuniary wrongful-death loss within the Act, confirming that § 8301—not some individualized property theory—was the operative framework.

Legal Reasoning

Federal pro se rule: The Court began with the settled federal principle (from Murray and Osei-Afriyie) that a non-attorney may represent only herself, not other parties’ interests.
Correcting the beneficiary category: The Court agreed with the District Court’s ultimate conclusion but corrected its rationale: Pennsylvania wrongful-death recoveries belong to statutory relatives under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301(b), not to the estate as such. Thus, the relevant “others” are the potential wrongful-death beneficiaries (spouse/children/parents), even if they are not estate beneficiaries or even if one child disclaims estate interests.
Wrongful-death action is inherently representative: Relying on Tulewicz v. SEPTA and the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure (Pa. R. Civ. P. 2201–2202), the Court emphasized that wrongful-death litigation proceeds on behalf of all entitled beneficiaries, and the filing of one action bars subsequent wrongful-death suits. That structural feature makes the pro se plaintiff functionally a representative for others.
Application to Clemente’s pleadings: The record referenced additional children beyond the daughter who signed a release. Because those children could be entitled to share in wrongful-death damages, Clemente could not show that “no other interests” were at stake. Under the federal pro se bar, she therefore could not maintain the wrongful-death case without counsel.
Downstream effect on vicarious liability: Without a viable underlying wrongful-death claim she could prosecute pro se, the institutional defendants’ vicarious-liability exposure could not proceed on her pro se pleadings, so those claims were dismissed on similar terms.

Impact

Although designated non-precedential under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion offers a clear roadmap for recurring federal-diversity malpractice/wrongful-death filings:

Estate disclaimers are not a shortcut: A disclaimer or release relating to the estate does not necessarily eliminate a person’s status as a potential wrongful-death beneficiary under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301(b).
“Trustee ad litem” structure triggers the pro se bar: Because Pennsylvania wrongful-death procedure consolidates beneficiaries’ rights into a single action that binds all, a pro se plaintiff is effectively representing others—impermissible in federal court without counsel.
Pleading strategy cannot recharacterize wrongful-death losses: Attempts to reframe pecuniary-loss damages as personal property or individualized tort claims may be rejected where the losses fall within wrongful-death compensatory aims (as explained with Miller v. Phila. Geriatric Ctr.).
Practical consequence: In federal court, wrongful-death claims with multiple potential statutory beneficiaries will typically require counsel—even if only one beneficiary wants to litigate and others are passive or unidentified.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Wrongful death beneficiaries vs. estate beneficiaries: Under Pennsylvania law, a wrongful-death case compensates the spouse/children/parents for their own losses (support, services, etc.). That money is not simply “the estate’s” money. Estate beneficiaries inherit under a will/intestacy; wrongful-death beneficiaries are defined by statute (42 Pa. C.S. § 8301(b)).
Personal representative: The executor/administrator who manages the estate. Under Pa. R. Civ. P. 2202(a), the personal representative has priority to bring the wrongful-death action during the first six months after death.
Trustee ad litem: After six months, an eligible beneficiary may sue on behalf of all entitled beneficiaries (Pa. R. Civ. P. 2202(b)); the filer acts like a trustee for the group’s claim, which is why the case cannot be treated as purely “personal” in federal pro se terms.
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal: Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Here, the defect was procedural/representational: the complaint could not proceed because the plaintiff could not legally litigate others’ interests without a lawyer.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal because a Pennsylvania wrongful-death action is a single, unified claim pursued for all statutory beneficiaries, and federal courts do not permit a non-attorney to represent those other interests. The opinion’s key contribution is its clarification that the relevant “other interests” are not limited to estate beneficiaries; they include all potential wrongful-death beneficiaries under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301(b). As a result, a pro se spouse/personal representative generally must retain counsel to litigate wrongful-death claims in federal court where other beneficiaries may share in the recovery.