Continuing-Violation Tolling Requires Post-Accrual “Affirmative Acts,” and Prosecutors Remain Absolutely Immune for Advocacy-Phase Conduct in § 1983 Malicious-Prosecution Suits

1. Introduction

In Ronnie Williams v. Diana Dunn (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2026) (non-precedential), Delaware prisoner Ronnie C. Williams sued two Deputy Attorneys General (Diana Dunn and Kelly Sheridan) and two New Castle County detectives (Joshuah Smith and Keith Sydnor) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Williams alleged that the investigation and prosecution leading to his incarceration constituted malicious prosecution and abuse of process under the U.S. and Delaware Constitutions, and he also asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The key appellate issues were whether the District Court erred by (1) applying Heck v. Humphrey, (2) invoking Rooker-Feldman, (3) holding that the prosecutors’ conduct was protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity, and (4) refusing to toll limitations based on a “continuing violation” theory as to the detectives.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice. It agreed that (a) claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of Williams’s convictions are barred by Heck v. Humphrey; (b) Rooker-Feldman would bar an appellate-style attack on state-court judgments (though the panel read the District Court as not relying on it as a dispositive ground); (c) claims against the prosecutors were barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity because their alleged conduct was undertaken in their role as advocates; and (d) claims against the detectives were untimely because the “continuing violation” doctrine did not apply absent post-arrest “affirmative acts,” and there was no basis for equitable tolling.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373 (3d Cir. 2016) — Provided the standard of review (plenary review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals) and the rule that factual allegations are accepted as true and construed favorably to the plaintiff. This framed the lens through which Williams’s pro se allegations were evaluated.
Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167 (3d Cir. 2022) — Supplied the plausibility pleading requirement (“plausible on its face”), reinforcing that conclusory assertions will not survive dismissal.
Stringer v. Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2019)) — Supported the appellate court’s authority to affirm “on any basis supported by the record,” enabling affirmance even if particular district-court observations (e.g., Rooker-Feldman) were not dispositive.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) and Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2013) — Balanced liberal construction of pro se pleadings with the requirement that pro se litigants still follow ordinary litigation rules.
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) — Recognized that dismissal at the pleadings stage may be appropriate where an affirmative defense (such as limitations or immunity) is apparent on the face of the complaint.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2006) — Anchored the bar on § 1983 claims that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction or the duration of confinement. The panel treated Heck as a correct limiting principle for claims attacking the investigation/prosecution that produced Williams’s convictions.
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) — Provided the doctrinal boundary that federal district courts cannot function as appellate courts over state judgments. The panel emphasized the doctrine as a “would bar” observation rather than the operative dismissal ground.
Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008) and Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2020) — Controlled the immunity analysis. Together they articulate the functional approach: absolute prosecutorial immunity covers acts performed while “functioning as the state’s advocate” and work “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” This was dispositive for Dunn and Sheridan.
Randall v. City of Phila. Law Dep't, 919 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)) — Supplied the limitations framework: § 1983 borrows the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period, and accrual principles follow federal law. The panel used these cases to situate Delaware’s two-year period under 10 Del. C. § 8119.
Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny, 756 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2014) and Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001) — Defined the “continuing violation” doctrine’s limits: it requires continuing unlawful acts (i.e., “affirmative acts”), not merely continuing harmful effects from an earlier event. This directly defeated Williams’s tolling theory because he alleged no affirmative conduct after his September 2019 arrest.
Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 1999) — Provided the equitable tolling touchstones (prevention from asserting rights or being misled). The panel noted Williams did not claim equitable tolling and the record suggested none.
Hickman v. Donovan, 2025 WL 2410092 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 2025) and Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1 (2021) — Cited by Williams to challenge immunity, but the panel found the argument inapposite because the District Court did not reach qualified immunity; it dismissed the prosecutors on absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Williams v. State, 296 A.3d 895 (Del. 2023) — Used primarily to supply procedural and factual context for the underlying convictions and charges.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Heck as a gatekeeping constraint (not necessarily the sole ground). The panel agreed with the District Court’s observation that to the extent Williams’s malicious-prosecution theory attacked the investigation/prosecution culminating in convictions that remain intact, success would “implicitly call into question” the validity of those convictions, triggering Heck v. Humphrey as explained by Williams v. Consovoy. Practically, this forecloses § 1983 damages claims that function as collateral attacks unless and until the conviction is invalidated through appropriate channels.
Rooker-Feldman as a boundary on direct review of state judgments. The panel read the District Court as merely noting that federal civil-rights litigation cannot be used as a substitute for appellate review of state-court criminal judgments. This matters because pro se complaints often blend damages allegations with requests that would effectively nullify state outcomes.
Absolute prosecutorial immunity for advocacy-phase conduct. Relying on the functional test in Odd v. Malone and Fogle v. Sokol, the court concluded Dunn and Sheridan were sued for actions undertaken as advocates in pursuing prosecution—conduct “intimately associated” with the judicial phase. That placement within the advocacy function, rather than investigatory or administrative roles, triggered absolute immunity, ending the claims regardless of alleged motive.
Limitations and the continuing-violation doctrine: “affirmative acts” required. For Smith and Sydnor, the panel agreed that the Delaware two-year period under Randall/Wallace and 10 Del. C. § 8119 applied, and that Williams could not extend accrual by labeling ongoing consequences as a continuing violation. Under Tearpock-Martini and Cowell, continuing violation requires continual unlawful acts, not continuing ill effects. The complaint alleged no affirmative act after the September 2019 arrest.
No equitable tolling on this record. Under Seitzinger, equitable tolling generally requires that a plaintiff was prevented from asserting rights or misled. The panel noted Williams did not assert such a theory, and nothing suggested those conditions.

3.3. Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the decision reinforces several recurring, practical constraints on civil-rights suits arising from criminal prosecutions:

Heck remains a powerful screen against damages claims that would undermine still-valid convictions, channeling such disputes into direct appeal/post-conviction remedies before § 1983 litigation.
Prosecutorial immunity remains broad when the alleged misconduct is tied to advocacy in the judicial phase; pleading around absolute immunity requires well-pled facts placing conduct in a non-advocacy function (e.g., purely investigative acts), and even then other defenses (qualified immunity, probable cause, limitations) may apply.
Continuing violation is not a universal tolling device in wrongful-arrest/prosecution narratives; plaintiffs must identify post-accrual affirmative acts, not simply ongoing incarceration or reputational harm.
Early dismissal on defenses apparent on the face of the complaint is affirmed, consistent with Schmidt v. Skolas, signaling that immunity/limitations issues can be resolved at Rule 12(b)(6) where the pleadings establish them.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Heck bar (Heck v. Humphrey): A person cannot use § 1983 to win money damages by proving facts that would mean their still-valid conviction is unlawful. They must first get the conviction overturned through appropriate criminal or habeas procedures.
Rooker-Feldman doctrine: Federal district courts (and courts of appeals reviewing them) generally cannot act like appellate courts over state-court judgments. If the injury alleged is essentially “the state court ruled against me,” federal trial courts typically cannot grant relief that would undo that judgment.
Absolute prosecutorial immunity: Prosecutors are completely shielded from civil damages for actions taken as courtroom advocates (e.g., pursuing charges, presenting the case). The focus is on the function performed, not the prosecutor’s intent.
Continuing violation doctrine: The clock does not restart just because harm continues. There must be new unlawful actions by the defendant during the limitations period—“affirmative acts”—not simply ongoing effects of an earlier alleged wrong.
Equitable tolling: A narrow exception that can pause the deadline when fairness demands it—typically where the plaintiff was actively misled or prevented from filing in time.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision affirms a familiar but consequential framework for § 1983 suits tied to criminal prosecutions: claims that would undermine an intact conviction are constrained by Heck; prosecutors acting as advocates are protected by absolute immunity under Odd and Fogle; and plaintiffs cannot evade limitations by invoking “continuing violation” absent post-accrual affirmative acts under Cowell and Tearpock-Martini. Even as a non-precedential disposition, the opinion illustrates how immunity and timeliness defenses can decisively end such cases at the pleading stage.