Short-Term Rental Zoning Upheld: No Third-Party Standing for Guests and Strong Deference to Municipal Land-Use Regulation

1. Introduction

In Tom Hutto v. City of Rock Hill (4th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026) (unpublished), STR host and property owner Tom Hutto challenged the City of Rock Hill’s evolving regulatory scheme for short-term rentals (“STRs,” rentals of 30 days or fewer). The City first regulated STRs in 2020, amended its approach in 2022, and then substantially revised the framework in 2023—limiting new STRs largely to specified commercial zones and allowing previously-permitted residential STRs (including most of Hutto’s) to continue only during a five-year amortization period ending in 2028.

Hutto brought seven federal constitutional claims, including claims asserted on behalf of his guests (First Amendment and Privileges and Immunities), and claims asserted on his own behalf (retaliation, “right to livelihood,” equal protection, substantive due process, and Dormant Commerce Clause). The district court granted summary judgment to the City, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed—emphasizing (i) limits on third-party standing, (ii) the breadth of legislative privilege in civil discovery involving municipal policymaking, and (iii) the high bar for federal constitutional challenges to zoning-based STR restrictions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Legislative privilege: The court affirmed the district court’s order allowing the City to invoke legislative privilege during depositions of a City Council representative and the Planning and Development Director for questions probing legislative activities and deliberation.
Third-party standing: Hutto lacked standing to sue on behalf of STR guests because he did not show a sufficient “hindrance” to guests protecting their own interests.
Retaliation: Even if the 2023 regulations followed Hutto’s lawsuit, he offered no evidence that retaliatory animus was the but-for cause of the City’s action.
Merits of zoning-based constitutional claims: The court held the STR limits and amortization scheme fit within traditional zoning authority and survived rational-basis review; equal protection failed because Hutto was not treated differently from similarly situated comparators; substantive due process failed because the ordinance had a conceivable rational relationship to legitimate zoning objectives; and Dormant Commerce Clause failed for lack of evidence of discrimination against out-of-state guests.

Although unpublished and “not binding precedent,” the decision consolidates several doctrinal guardrails relevant to STR litigation in the Fourth Circuit: municipal land-use regulation receives heavy deference, and attempts to reframe zoning disputes as federal constitutional violations face steep doctrinal hurdles.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and summary judgment posture

The court described the summary judgment lens by citing Tederick v. LoanCare, LLC, requiring facts be taken in the light most favorable to the non-movant. On appellate review of the merits, it relied on Aleman v. City of Charlotte for de novo review of summary judgment. In the legislative privilege section, it noted uncertainty about the review standard and compared approaches in: Parr v. Cougle, Pernell v. Fla. Bd. of Governors of the State Univ., United States v. Caldwell, United States v. Hamilton, and Lee v. City of Los Angeles—but ultimately held the outcome was the same under any standard.

2) Legislative privilege and its exceptions

The panel grounded legislative privilege in the speech-or-debate tradition by citing E.E.O.C. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, which (i) connects legislative privilege to legislative immunity, and (ii) recognizes its extension to local lawmakers and even non-legislator actors “properly acting in a legislative capacity.” It relied on Bogan v. Scott-Harris for the proposition that local legislators may receive legislative immunity for legislative acts.

For limits on privilege, the court focused on United States v. Gillock, where the Supreme Court refused to recognize a state legislative privilege in federal criminal enforcement. Hutto invoked Benisek v. Lamone as potentially supporting motive discovery in retaliation contexts, but the court treated Benisek cautiously, noting its posture and lack of analysis. It highlighted the district court’s narrow framing in Benisek v. Lamone (D. Md. 2017) as pertaining to redistricting, referenced Tangipa v. Newsom for the prevalence of privilege claims in redistricting cases, and cited Pernell v. Fla. Bd. of Governors of the State Univ. for the observation that the Supreme Court has not clearly expanded Gillock beyond criminal cases.

The court also relied on waiver/insufficient briefing principles from United States v. Fernandez Sanchez to reject Hutto’s undeveloped argument for expanding Benisek into a broad civil-retaliation exception.

3) Third-party standing doctrine

The standing analysis tracked modern Supreme Court and circuit formulations: United States v. Hansen for the default rule against asserting third parties’ rights; Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med. for the “narrow class” of cases allowing third-party standing; and Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv. for the three-part test (injury-in-fact, close relationship, and hindrance). The panel emphasized the plaintiff’s burden from Sheppheard v. Morrisey and the general disfavor of third-party standing from Maryland v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.. It analogized to STR litigation standing issues via Keep Chi. Livable v. City of Chicago, underscoring that transient travel patterns do not automatically create a “hindrance.”

4) First Amendment retaliation causation

The court used Nieves v. Bartlett for the core retaliation framework and its but-for causation requirement. It rejected the idea that clarifying or revising an ordinance in response to litigation is inherently retaliatory, citing Sanimax USA, LLC v. City of South St. Paul. It relied on zoning-targeting guidance from Siena Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville, which warns that an enactment prompted by a particular dispute is not necessarily “aimed solely” at the complainant. It also applied briefing-waiver logic from Parkins ex rel. Turner v. McMaster to disregard undeveloped challenges.

5) Substantive due process, “right to livelihood,” and rational-basis deference

For the asserted “right to livelihood,” the court cited Conn v. Gabbert for the limited due process interest in choosing one’s occupation, but emphasized it is subject to reasonable regulation. It confirmed rational-basis review through Doe v. Settle and reinforced the “irrationality” threshold for professional restrictions via Prynne v. Settle (quoting Litmon v. Harris). The court used Doe v. Settle to articulate an especially demanding rational-basis framework: any conceivable legitimate purpose suffices, and plaintiffs must negate every conceivable basis. For STR-specific analogs, it cited Diamond Sands Apartments, LLC v. Clark County and Nekrilov v. City of Jersey City as persuasive authority recognizing housing stock and neighborhood character as legitimate interests supporting STR restrictions.

6) Equal protection comparators

The court applied comparator principles from Morrison v. Garraghty, emphasizing that equal protection requires differential treatment of persons “alike in all relevant respects.” Hutto failed at the threshold because STR hosts were not treated differently from similarly situated property owners, and homeowners associations were not comparable entities.

7) Zoning-context substantive due process and Dormant Commerce Clause

The substantive due process analysis relied on Clayland Farm Enters., LLC v. Talbot County for the three-part test and its “particularly high hurdle” in zoning. The court invoked Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County to frame substantive due process as policing only the “conceivable outer limits” of legitimate zoning power. For the Dormant Commerce Clause, it distinguished standing principles via N. Va. Hemp & Agric., LLC v. Virginia and rejected the merits claim by analogizing to Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica, which treats land-use regulation as “inherently local” and not an interstate commerce burden merely because it affects visitors.

8) The “political” nature of zoning disputes and judicial-bias allegations

The opinion situated the dispute within the traditional political domain of land use by citing Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach. It also cautioned counsel about accusations of judicial bias, referencing the statutory recusal framework (28 U.S.C. § 455) and Belue v. Leventhal for the principle that recusal motions are not “brushback pitches.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Legislative privilege: protected deliberation for municipal policymaking

The court treated the depositions as seeking to probe legislative activity—precisely what legislative privilege is designed to protect under E.E.O.C. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n. Critically, the court extended the privilege to (i) a municipal legislator and (ii) an executive-branch official involved in legislative work, reflecting the principle that the protection reaches those “properly acting in a legislative capacity,” and applies even when the governmental entity itself is subject to suit.

On exceptions, the court viewed United States v. Gillock as the clear, established carve-out (federal criminal enforcement), and declined to treat Benisek v. Lamone as a general “motive discovery” exception, largely because Hutto did not develop the argument and because Benisek’s posture (preliminary injunction order) and context (redistricting) did not persuasively justify expansion.

2) Standing: why a host cannot automatically sue for guests

The court treated the third-party standing “hindrance” prong as decisive. Hutto argued, essentially, that guests are transient (“here today and gone tomorrow”). But the panel required a concrete showing that guests cannot protect their interests—e.g., because claims would be inherently mooted, privacy would deter suit, or practical barriers would prevent litigation. Because Hutto did not explain why guests could not sue for injunctive relief in advance or damages afterward, the exception did not apply.

3) Retaliation: response to litigation is not enough; but-for causation controls

The court accepted that the City revised its rules partly in response to the lawsuit and that the 2023 rules were adverse in some respects. But under Nieves v. Bartlett, the decisive question was whether retaliatory animus was a but-for cause. The panel found no evidence of retaliatory motive—treating the 2023 changes as generally applicable zoning regulation rather than individualized punishment—and relied on Siena Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville to reject “targeting” theories based solely on who supplied the impetus for an ordinance.

4) Deference to zoning: rational basis and the outer limits of due process

For the “right to livelihood” theory, the court treated the STR restrictions as economic/land-use regulation, reviewed under rational basis. It credited the City’s stated goals—preserving housing stock and neighborhood residential character—as legitimate ends and found the means rationally related. Importantly, the panel reiterated that rational basis does not depend on subjective motives, does not require evidence, and is satisfied by any conceivable rational justification.

The substantive due process claim failed for essentially the same reason but under an even more deferential zoning-specific articulation: unless the action is arbitrary in the constitutional sense (no foundation in reason; no substantial relation to public health/safety), federal courts will not constitutionalize land-use disputes.

5) Equal protection and Dormant Commerce Clause: missing comparators, missing discrimination

Equal protection failed at the comparator stage: other property owners were subject to the same STR limits; gathering rules applied equally depending on whether the property was operated as an STR; and homeowners associations are not similarly situated to a private STR operator.

The Dormant Commerce Clause claim failed because the ordinance did not discriminate against out-of-state persons, and out-of-state travelers retained ample alternatives (including STRs in permitted zones and other lodging). The court treated incidental effects on travel demand as insufficient to convert local land-use controls into interstate-commerce discrimination.

C. Impact

STR regulation as ordinary zoning: The decision reinforces that municipalities can frame STR rules as land-use controls aimed at preserving neighborhood character and housing stock, and courts will typically review them under highly deferential standards.
Amortization periods likely insulated (federally): While not deciding state-law vested-right questions, the court’s approach suggests that a time-limited continuation of nonconforming STR use (here, five years) is unlikely to be struck down on federal substantive due process grounds if supported by plausible zoning objectives.
Limits on “guests’ rights” litigation strategy: STR operators seeking to assert customers’ First Amendment or travel-related rights should expect close scrutiny of third-party standing—especially the “hindrance” requirement.
Discovery constraints in motive-based claims: The opinion signals that legislative privilege remains robust in ordinary civil challenges to municipal ordinances, and that attempts to invoke Benisek v. Lamone to pierce privilege must be carefully developed and contextually justified.
Retaliation claims face causation and proof hurdles: Evidence that an ordinance was revised after a lawsuit will not alone establish retaliation; plaintiffs must prove retaliatory animus and but-for causation, not merely temporal or procedural linkage.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Legislative privilege: A protection that prevents forced disclosure (like deposition answers) about lawmakers’ legislative deliberations and acts, intended to preserve legislative independence. It can extend to local officials and even non-legislators when they are functioning in a legislative capacity.
Third-party standing: Usually, you can sue only for violations of your own rights. To sue for someone else’s rights, you must show (among other things) that the other person faces real obstacles (“hindrances”) to suing themselves.
Rational-basis review: The most deferential constitutional test. A law survives if there is any conceivable legitimate reason for it and the law is rationally related to that reason—even if the law is imperfect or arguably unwise.
Substantive due process (zoning context): A backstop against truly arbitrary government action. In zoning disputes, it is rarely successful because courts allow broad regulatory discretion unless the action is irrational in the constitutional sense.
Dormant Commerce Clause: A doctrine that prevents states and cities from discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce. Local land-use regulation is not invalid simply because it affects out-of-state visitors; discrimination or a substantial burden is usually required.
Amortization period: A grace period allowing existing uses that become nonconforming under a new ordinance to continue for a set time before they must stop or convert to conforming uses.

5. Conclusion

Tom Hutto v. City of Rock Hill affirms a strong, zoning-centered approach to STR regulation: municipalities may restrict where STRs operate and may phase out nonconforming STRs through amortization, consistent with traditional land-use authority. The decision also underscores two procedural barriers that can decide STR constitutional challenges early—robust legislative privilege shielding policymakers’ deliberations, and stringent third-party standing rules preventing hosts from suing on behalf of guests absent a concrete showing that guests cannot sue for themselves. More broadly, the opinion reflects the Fourth Circuit’s continued reluctance to constitutionalize zoning disputes, reserving federal intervention for genuinely discriminatory, retaliatory, or irrational exercises of power supported by evidence sufficient to meet demanding doctrinal standards.