I. Introduction

This appeal arose from the revocation of Preston Mills, Jr.’s supervised release based on alleged new criminal conduct—strangulation and assault and battery of a family member—connected to a May 2021 incident involving his then-ex-girlfriend, Jessica Rodriguez. After earlier federal convictions (drug conspiracy and a § 924(c) firearm offense), Mills had already experienced one prior revocation for similar allegations. The second revocation proceeding, however, unfolded unusually slowly: the parties sought multiple continuances in order to await the completion of Mills’ related state prosecution, resulting in Mills remaining on supervision beyond the original June 2023 end date until the federal revocation was resolved in January 2025.

Mills raised two appellate issues: (1) whether the district court clearly erred in finding a new-crime violation (principally strangulation), and (2) whether the 24-month revocation sentence was plainly unreasonable because the court did not address a non-frivolous mitigation argument—namely, that he should receive “credit” in sentencing for the additional 19 months he remained under supervision during the pendency of the revocation petition.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Revocation affirmed

The Fourth Circuit held the district court did not clearly err in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mills committed strangulation and assault and battery, and thus did not abuse its discretion in revoking supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The panel emphasized deference to credibility determinations and the corroborative value of contemporaneous text messages and supporting testimony.

B. Sentence vacated and remanded

The Fourth Circuit vacated the 24-month sentence as plainly unreasonable because the sentencing record did not reflect that the district court considered Mills’ potentially meritorious mitigation argument about the 19-month extended period of supervised release. The court acknowledged it was possible the district judge considered this factor, but reiterated appellate review cannot rest on speculation; the record must contain “some affirmation” that such an argument was considered.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is a synthesis of two lines of authority: (1) the deferential review of revocation factfinding and credibility determinations, and (2) the requirement—though “a low bar”—that sentencing courts acknowledge and respond to non-frivolous mitigation arguments even in the revocation context.

• Rico v. United States, 607 U.S. __, 2026 WL 815786 (Mar. 25, 2026): Cited for the proposition that a court’s revocation power can extend beyond the scheduled expiration of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) when a warrant or summons issues before expiration, for a period “reasonably necessary” to adjudicate violations. In Mills, this explains the legality of continued supervision through January 2025, but it also sets the stage for Mills’ mitigation claim: lawful extension still entails real liberty restraints that may matter at sentencing.
• United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2020): Serves two roles. First, it frames the revocation standard (preponderance) and review (abuse of discretion; clear error for facts). Second, it supplies the procedural-reasonableness principle that the record must show “some affirmation” the court considered mitigation arguments; otherwise the appellate court cannot “effectively review” the sentence’s reasonableness.
• United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2010), quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993): Reinforces what “preponderance of the evidence” means—more probable than not. This standard is pivotal in supervised release revocations, where the government need not prove violations beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985): Provides the bedrock for deference to trial-level factfinding and credibility determinations; where two coherent and plausible stories exist, appellate courts “virtually never” find clear error merely by preferring the other account.
• United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017): Quoted via Patterson to illustrate the narrow circumstances for overturning credibility findings (e.g., “physically impossible” observations). Its inclusion underscores the Fourth Circuit’s reluctance to reweigh testimony in revocation appeals.
• United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2018): Establishes the “more deferential” posture for revocation sentences and links procedural reasonableness to an assurance the court considered applicable factors and arguments.
• United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006): Supplies the two-step framework: determine unreasonableness (procedural/substantive), then determine whether it is “plainly” unreasonable (clear or obvious).
• United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2017): Central to the remand. Slappy holds that even with relaxed revocation-sentencing requirements, a court cannot entirely fail to mention nonfrivolous sentencing arguments or provide at least some reason they are unpersuasive. Mills extends that logic to an “extended supervision” mitigation theory.
• United States v. Celedon, 165 F.4th 873 (4th Cir. 2026): Cited to support the conclusion that the kind of procedural omission present here can qualify as “clearly and obviously” unreasonable, satisfying the “plainly unreasonable” prong.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the revocation stands (factfinding and corroboration)

The panel treated Mills’ revocation challenge as an invitation to reweigh credibility—an approach foreclosed by Patterson and Anderson absent extreme circumstances. The district court expressly credited Ms. Rodriguez and her daughter, discredited Mills, and emphasized contemporaneous text messages in which Mills apologized and took “full accountability” without denying Ms. Rodriguez’s description (“slammed, punched and choked”). The Fourth Circuit deemed the district court’s narrative “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” satisfying clear-error review.

2. Why the sentence cannot stand (procedural reasonableness and record reviewability)

The critical move in the opinion is its insistence on record evidence that the district court considered a “potentially meritorious” mitigation argument: that Mills spent an additional 19 months on supervised release (and complied) due to the protracted federal proceedings. The panel acknowledged the judge was aware of the extension and even discussed a related legal issue—whether additional supervised release could be imposed—but held that legal permissibility is not the same as sentencing consideration.

The court framed the problem as one of appellate function: without a record indication that the mitigation argument mattered (or was rejected), appellate courts cannot “effectively review” the sentence. Because Fourth Circuit law “well-settled[ly]” requires “enough of an explanation to assure” consideration of arguments, the omission was not only unreasonable but plainly (clearly/obviously) so.

C. Impact

The decision’s likely influence lies less in revocation proof standards (which are longstanding) and more in how revocation sentencing records must be built when proceedings extend supervision beyond its scheduled end date:

• “Extended supervision” becomes a recognizable mitigation category: Where § 3583(i) prolongs supervision while a petition is pending, defendants may argue that additional months (especially with compliance) are a meaningful liberty restraint that should be weighed under the § 3553(a) factors applicable in revocation.
• Judges must separate “authority” questions from “weight” questions: Mills distinguishes between (a) whether the court may impose further supervision or custody as a legal matter and (b) whether, and how, prolonged supervision should affect the ultimate sentencing choice.
• Appellate review remains deferential—but not toothless: The case reinforces that “plainly unreasonable” review still polices a minimum procedural floor: a sentencing explanation must show consideration of nonfrivolous mitigation.
• Institutional incentives: Parties and courts may be more careful when continuing revocation hearings to await state outcomes, knowing that resulting supervision extensions can create additional mitigation issues requiring explicit on-the-record treatment.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release: A post-prison monitoring period with conditions (e.g., do not commit new crimes). Violations can lead to revocation and imprisonment.
• Revocation standard (“preponderance of the evidence”): The judge need only find it more likely than not that a violation occurred—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Clear error (fact review): An appellate court does not decide what it would have believed; it asks whether the district court’s account is plausible given the whole record, especially when credibility is involved.
• Chapter Seven policy statements: Nonbinding Guidelines guidance for revocation sentencing. Courts must consider them but are not required to follow them.
• “Plainly unreasonable” revocation review: A two-step inquiry: (1) was the sentence unreasonable (procedurally/substantively)? (2) if so, was that unreasonableness clear or obvious?
• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (delayed adjudication): Even after the scheduled end of supervision, courts can still revoke if a warrant/summons issued before expiration, for the time reasonably necessary to decide the violation.
• Mitigation argument: A defendant’s reason for a lower sentence. Mills holds that a potentially meritorious mitigation claim must be acknowledged and addressed on the record.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Preston Mills, Jr. reaffirms strong deference to revocation factfinding—especially credibility determinations supported by contemporaneous corroboration—but it simultaneously tightens procedural expectations for revocation sentencing records. When a defendant plausibly argues that extended supervision during delayed revocation proceedings meaningfully restrained liberty and warrants sentencing credit, the district court must make a record showing the argument was considered. Absent that record assurance, even a within-or-below-Guidelines revocation sentence can be procedurally unreasonable and, under settled Fourth Circuit law, plainly so—requiring vacatur and remand.