Carter v. Dupuy: Brief, Minimal Physical Guidance to Remove a Noncompliant Parent from a School Office Is De Minimis Force and Not a Fourth Amendment Violation

1. Introduction

Carter v. Dupuy arises from a tense encounter at Live Oak High School after Louisiana’s Department of Children and Family Services initiated a child-abuse investigation and instructed the school not to release Amanda Carter’s daughter to the Carters. When Carter arrived at the school and refused to leave the front office without her child, school officials requested assistance from the on-site school resource officer, Deputy Chad Dupuy. The interaction escalated verbally, and Dupuy used brief physical contact—grasping Carter’s arm, attempting to pull her toward the door, and pushing her a few inches through the doorway—to remove her from the office.

Carter sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth Amendment excessive force, and also asserted Louisiana tort claims (negligence, assault, battery) against Dupuy and vicarious liability claims against Sheriff Jason Ard in his official capacity. The district court denied qualified immunity at summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding the force was de minimis and therefore not constitutionally excessive, and it also disposed of the state claims because they rose or fell with “excessive force.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion is best read as a synthesis of Fifth Circuit “de minimis force” doctrine with Supreme Court excessive-force standards and appellate jurisdiction rules governing qualified-immunity appeals.

• Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1996)
  The opinion opens by quoting Ikerd for the core proposition that some officer contact is too nominal to be actionable and that force “insufficient to satisfy the legal standard necessary for recovery” is de minimis for constitutional purposes. This case supplies the doctrinal frame: the question is not whether contact occurred, but whether the amount of force crosses the constitutional threshold.
• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
  Graham provides the objective-reasonableness standard and its familiar factors (severity of the crime, immediate threat, and resistance/flight). The court uses Graham both rhetorically (“not every push or shove”) and analytically to situate the encounter within the totality of circumstances—particularly Carter’s refusal to comply and the school setting during a child-protection investigation.
• Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)
  Cited for the rule that denials of qualified immunity are immediately appealable to the extent they turn on issues of law. This anchors the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction to review the legal materiality of the facts assumed at summary judgment.
• Spikes v. Wheat, 141 F.4th 662 (5th Cir. 2025)
  Clarifies the appellate posture: when a qualified-immunity denial rests on disputed facts, the appellate court cannot reweigh “genuineness,” but may decide whether disputes are material to the legal question of immunity. The opinion uses Spikes to define the narrow scope of review.
• Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2016) and Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019)
  These cases state the ordinary summary-judgment lens: view facts and reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor and ask whether immunity would still apply on those assumed facts; review is de novo. They operate as baseline methodology before the court pivots to the “video evidence” rule.
• Scott v. City of Mandeville, 69 F.4th 249 (5th Cir. 2023)
  Provides the key evidentiary filter: with video evidence, courts need not accept a non-movant’s version if contradicted by the recording, and should view the facts “in the light depicted by the videotape.” This supports the court’s concrete description of force duration (about four seconds) and limited movement (a few inches), which are central to the de minimis conclusion.
• Ashcroft v. al- Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011)
  Supplies the two-prong qualified-immunity framework (violation + clearly established) and the discretion to address prongs in any order. The Fifth Circuit resolves the case on prong one (no violation), avoiding the “clearly established” inquiry.
• Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2009)
  Sets out the Fifth Circuit’s excessive-force elements: injury, direct causation from force that is clearly excessive, and excessiveness that is clearly unreasonable. The court treats Manis as the operative test and concludes the contact here was not “clearly excessive,” characterizing it as de minimis.
• Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025)
  Cited for the instruction to evaluate the totality of the circumstances. The court uses this to emphasize the context: a school office, a child-abuse investigation, Carter’s escalating anger and refusal to comply, and the officer’s immediate cessation of force once she was outside.
• Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116 (5th Cir. 1996)
  Authorizes pendent appellate jurisdiction over closely related issues to promote judicial economy, particularly where refusing would undermine the purpose of immunity (avoiding trial). This precedent enables the Fifth Circuit to reach and resolve the Louisiana tort claims in the same interlocutory appeal.
• Harvey v. City of Eunice Police Dep't, 2010-1228 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 62 So. 3d 290 and Patton v. Self, 2006-1029 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/7/07), 952 So. 2d 874
  These Louisiana cases stand for the proposition that excessive force can constitute negligence and can convert otherwise privileged force into actionable battery with employer liability. The Fifth Circuit uses them to show that, under Louisiana law as presented, the state claims depend on a threshold “excessive force” finding—which the court rejects on these facts.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s reasoning proceeds in a disciplined sequence: (1) define the appellate lens for qualified-immunity denials; (2) apply qualified immunity’s two-prong framework but resolve only prong one; (3) assess excessive force under the Fifth Circuit’s Manis v. Lawson elements and Graham v. Connor factors, viewed through Barnes v. Felix’s “totality” instruction; and (4) treat the minimal, momentary contact as de minimis under Ikerd v. Blair.

Several factual features do the work in the court’s analysis:

• Duration and magnitude: force lasted “at most, four seconds” and moved Carter “a few inches.”
• Purpose and context: removing an agitated, noncompliant adult from a school office while awaiting a child-protection agent, framed as “for the safety of everyone involved.”
• Escalation control: once Carter was outside, Dupuy “ceased all force” and removed his hands.
• Resistance/noncompliance: Carter refused the instruction to step outside and insisted on remaining until her child was released.

Notably, the court does not treat the absence of a serious injury as the sole determinant. Instead, it characterizes the force itself as constitutionally nominal—placing the case within Fifth Circuit doctrine that some physical contact is simply too slight, in context, to satisfy “clearly excessive” and “clearly unreasonable” requirements.

3.3 Impact

The decision’s practical significance lies in how it tightens the lane for excessive-force claims premised on brief “escort” or “removal” contact in institutional settings (here, a school office), especially when:

• the plaintiff is noncompliant with a direction to move away from a sensitive area,
• the officer’s contact is momentary and limited in displacement,
• video evidence fixes the encounter’s scope, and
• force stops immediately once the immediate objective (moving the person outside) is achieved.

Two forward-looking implications stand out:

• De minimis as a gatekeeping concept at prong one: By resolving qualified immunity on “no violation,” the court reinforces that de minimis force can defeat a claim before courts ever reach “clearly established law,” thereby limiting discovery and trial in low-force encounters.
• State-law piggyback claims may fall with the federal excessive-force theory: Exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction, the court signals that when state tort claims are pleaded as “excessive force” analogs (negligence/assault/battery), they may be disposed of in the same interlocutory appeal if their viability depends on the same force assessment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified immunity: A doctrine shielding government officials from civil damages unless the plaintiff shows (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time. If the court finds no violation (prong one), the case can end without deciding prong two.
• Excessive force (Fourth Amendment): Force is judged objectively—whether it was reasonable under the circumstances, not whether the officer had good or bad intent. Courts consider the Graham v. Connor factors and the “totality of the circumstances.”
• De minimis force: So minor in degree and duration that it does not rise to the level of a constitutional wrong in context. The opinion treats a brief arm grasp and a small push through a doorway as de minimis here.
• Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before final judgment. Denials of qualified immunity are often immediately appealable because immunity is meant to protect officials from the burdens of trial.
• Pendent appellate jurisdiction: A discretionary power allowing an appellate court, in an interlocutory immunity appeal, to decide additional closely related issues (like linked state-law claims) to avoid inefficient piecemeal litigation.
• Video-evidence rule: When a recording squarely contradicts a litigant’s version, courts may rely on the video’s depiction rather than assume the contradicted narrative at summary judgment.

5. Conclusion

Carter v. Dupuy reinforces a Fifth Circuit throughline: not every unwanted police touch is a constitutional event. Applying Graham v. Connor, Manis v. Lawson, and Ikerd v. Blair, the court held that a brief arm grasp and small push used to remove a noncompliant parent from a school office—especially as shown on video and promptly discontinued—constituted de minimis force and therefore no Fourth Amendment violation. By also reaching the Louisiana tort claims under Morin v. Caire, the opinion highlights that state-law assault/battery/negligence theories premised on “excessive force” may collapse when the underlying force is deemed constitutionally and factually nominal.