Reliable Testimony, “Same Course of Conduct,” and Burden-Shifting Sustain Drug-Weight Attribution and §2D1.1(b)(1) Firearm Enhancement

1. Introduction

In United States v. Curtis Phillips (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 360-month sentence over a procedural-reasonableness challenge. The defendant, Curtis J. Phillips, pleaded guilty to (1) possessing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine on March 17, 2023 (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) and (2) being a felon in possession of a firearm on June 18, 2024 (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).

The core sentencing disputes were (a) whether additional seized drugs from multiple encounters (April 4, 2023; December 28, 2023; June 18, 2024; and June 28, 2024) could be attributed to Phillips as relevant conduct in the Guidelines “converted drug weight” calculation, and (b) whether the two-level “dangerous weapon” enhancement applied under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Phillips argued the government failed to prove the drugs and guns were his, and that several incidents were not part of the “same course of conduct or common scheme or plan” as the offense of conviction under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Phillips’s objections. First, it found no clear error in attributing the challenged drug quantities to Phillips because the government supported attribution with sufficiently reliable physical and testimonial evidence, including law-enforcement testimony and contemporaneous statements from other residents. Second, it upheld the dangerous-weapon enhancement, concluding that the district court correctly applied the Sixth Circuit’s burden-shifting framework: the government established possession of firearms in proximity to drugs, and Phillips failed to show it was “clearly improbable” that the firearms were connected to the drug offense. The court therefore affirmed the 360-month sentence.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Hawkins, 165 F.4th 442 (6th Cir. 2026): Provided the overarching abuse-of-discretion framework for reviewing sentences and reinforced that a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if based on clearly erroneous facts. The panel used Hawkins to frame the appellate posture: Phillips had to show the district court relied on clearly erroneous factual determinations, not merely that another view of the facts was possible.
United States v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074 (6th Cir. 2015) and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Cited for the proposition that procedural error includes selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts. These cases supplied the doctrinal bridge between Guidelines factfinding and procedural reasonableness.
United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2008): Controlled the standard for reviewing drug-quantity determinations (clear error) and recognized that quantities may be proven through physical evidence or testimonial evidence. The panel relied on Jeross to treat sheriff testimony plus seized-contraband circumstances as sufficient evidentiary support.
United States v. Simpson, 138 F.4th 438 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wynn v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 276 (2025): Reinforced that the government’s burden for quantity findings is preponderance of the evidence. This lowered standard (relative to trial) mattered because Phillips’s objections effectively demanded a higher level of certainty.
United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Owusu, 199 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2000)): Supplied a key constraint on sentencing factfinding: evidence must have “at least a minimal level of reliability beyond mere allegation.” The opinion uses Sandridge/Owusu to validate the district court’s reliance on sworn testimony and corroborated statements.
United States v. Amerson, 886 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2018): Provided the operative test for “same course of conduct” (similarity, regularity, and time interval) and the rule that if one factor is weak, the others must be stronger. Amerson is the analytic backbone for grouping Phillips’s repeated drug-and-firearm episodes into one course of conduct.
United States v. Kappes, 936 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321 (6th Cir. 1990), plus United States v. Atkins, No. 25-5104, 2025 WL 3488274 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025): These cases were used comparatively to assess temporal proximity. Kappes illustrated remoteness (six years too remote), while Miller and Atkins supported that gaps of months (and even 20 months) may still fit a common course depending on other factors.
United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477 (6th Cir. 1996): Performed two distinct roles. First, it cautioned that time gaps do not necessarily show abandonment of a course of conduct where incarceration “forced” a pause. Second, it supplied the “clearly improbable” language used in the firearm-enhancement burden shift (as later quoted in other cases).
United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2009): Provided the mixed standard of review for the firearm enhancement: factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Kennedy, 65 F.4th 314 (6th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Catalan, 499 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2007): These cases supplied the Sixth Circuit’s burden-shifting framework for U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Kennedy explains that when a firearm is present at the scene, the possession/utilization inquiries often merge, and the government can meet its initial burden by establishing possession. Catalan articulates that the defendant must then show it was “clearly improbable” the firearm was connected to the offense.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Drug quantity / converted drug weight as relevant conduct

The panel treated Phillips’s challenge as a classic sentencing fact dispute governed by clear-error review and a preponderance burden. It emphasized two constraints that shaped its analysis:

Reliability of proof: Under United States v. Sandridge and United States v. Owusu, the court required “a minimal level of reliability beyond mere allegation.” Here, that threshold was met through: (i) seizures of large quantities of drugs from immediate physical proximity to Phillips, and (ii) sworn law-enforcement testimony (including the Lee County Sheriff’s account that Phillips admitted trafficking and described himself as a “one-stop shop”).
Connection to the offense of conviction (relevant conduct): Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) and United States v. Amerson, the court assessed similarity, repetition, and time interval. It found a repeating pattern—Phillips found unconscious with large meth quantities, cash, paraphernalia, and firearms—supporting a consistent distribution purpose and modus operandi.

On ownership/possession arguments (e.g., drugs could have belonged to other adults in a home; vehicle ownership disputes), the panel accepted the district court’s inference from proximity and control. For April 4, methamphetamine was within “less than three feet” of Phillips while he lay alone; other residents sought help and provided written statements that Phillips brought contraband into the house. For June 18, even if Phillips did not own the car, he was “the only one operating” it, and other evidence linked him to a recovered gun. Under United States v. Jeross, such physical plus testimonial evidence supports drug-quantity findings.

On the “same course of conduct” question, the court reasoned that close temporal clustering existed in key places: March 17 and April 4 were within three weeks; June 18 and June 28 were ten days apart. For longer gaps (December 2023 to June 2024), similarity and repetition carried the analysis. The panel also addressed a common defense argument—temporal distance implies disconnected conduct—by invoking United States v. Hill: incarceration can explain lapses as involuntary pauses rather than abandonment.

B. Dangerous weapon enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1))

Applying United States v. Angel (standards of review) and the burden-shifting framework from United States v. Kennedy and United States v. Catalan, the panel upheld the enhancement in two steps:

Government’s burden (preponderance): The government showed actual/constructive possession by locating firearms in the bedroom with Phillips (April 4) and in the vehicle with Phillips (June 18), alongside drugs and paraphernalia. Under Kennedy, presence at the scene commonly collapses the “utilized during the commission” inquiry into possession.
Defendant’s rebuttal burden (“clearly improbable”): Phillips argued the linkage evidence was out-of-court and unspecific, but the district court found repeated co-location of drugs and firearms near Phillips’s person and concluded Phillips did not show it was “clearly improbable” that the guns were connected to drug trafficking.

The appellate court’s affirmation reflects deference to the district court’s factfinding where multiple episodes show a recurring drug-and-gun nexus and where the defendant’s alternative explanations do not negate that connection to the demanding “clearly improbable” standard.

3.3. Impact

Although designated “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion is a practical signal of how the Sixth Circuit will evaluate common sentencing objections:

Relevant conduct is pattern-driven: Repeated episodes featuring the same combination (large meth quantities, paraphernalia, cash, firearms, and similar circumstances) can satisfy U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 even with gaps in time—especially when incarceration explains the pauses (United States v. Hill).
Reliability is often met by corroborated testimony plus proximity: The “minimal reliability” requirement (United States v. Sandridge; United States v. Owusu) is typically satisfied by sworn officer testimony, seized-contraband location facts, and corroborating statements, even when the defendant posits alternative owners.
Firearm enhancement remains difficult to defeat once possession is shown: Under United States v. Kennedy and United States v. Catalan, defendants face a steep “clearly improbable” burden—particularly where drugs and guns repeatedly appear together.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural reasonableness: A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the court uses the wrong legal rule, miscalculates the Guidelines, or relies on clearly wrong facts (as framed by United States v. Mack quoting Gall v. United States).
Converted drug weight: A Guidelines method that converts different drugs into a common metric so multiple drug types can be aggregated for a single base offense level. Disputes often center on what quantities count as “relevant conduct.”
Relevant conduct / “same course of conduct” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)): At sentencing, the court can include uncharged or non-conviction conduct if it is part of the same overall pattern as the convicted offense. Courts look to similarity, repetition, and timing (United States v. Amerson).
Clear error vs. de novo: “Clear error” is highly deferential; the appellate court will not reverse just because it would weigh evidence differently. “De novo” means no deference on purely legal questions (as summarized for the weapon issue via United States v. Angel).
Firearm enhancement burden-shifting: The government first shows possession (often enough when the gun is at the scene); then the defendant must show the gun’s connection to the drug offense is “clearly improbable” (United States v. Kennedy; United States v. Catalan).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Curtis Phillips reaffirms two durable Sixth Circuit sentencing themes: (1) drug quantities may be attributed as relevant conduct when supported by minimally reliable evidence and a demonstrated pattern satisfying similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; and (2) once the government shows firearm possession in proximity to drug activity, the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement will apply unless the defendant can meet the demanding “clearly improbable” rebuttal standard. The decision underscores the breadth of sentencing factfinding and the deference appellate courts give to district courts’ credibility and proximity-based inferences when the record depicts a consistent drug-trafficking pattern.