Rule 11 Misstatement of § 924(c) “Use/Carry” Elements Is Not Plainly Reversible Without Prejudice

I. Introduction

United States v. JoiSade Wilford (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2026) is an unpublished decision affirming a defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) after a guilty plea. The case arose from a multi-agency investigation into an alleged Nashville-area drug-trafficking group in which Wilford’s co-defendant (and then-boyfriend) was believed to be a principal supplier. Law enforcement surveillance focused on two residences allegedly used to store, prepare, and distribute drugs.

The key episode occurred on July 9, 2021, when Wilford and her co-defendant went to one residence after receiving word of a potential robbery of stored drugs. Security footage showed Wilford holding a firearm while “patrolling” the home. A superseding indictment charged Wilford with seven drug and firearm counts. She entered a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to one count: using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c)(1)(A), in exchange for dismissal of the remaining six counts. She received the five-year mandatory minimum and appealed, arguing (1) the plea colloquy misstated the elements, (2) the plea was involuntary, (3) the factual basis was insufficient, and (4) she was “actually innocent.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Applying plain-error review because Wilford did not object in the district court, the panel held:

The district court erred under Rule 11 by describing the § 924(c) element as “used, carried, or possessed,” but the error did not affect Wilford’s substantial rights because she failed to show a reasonable probability she would have rejected the plea absent the mistake.
Wilford’s plea was not involuntary; she was bound by her sworn colloquy statements that she was not coerced.
The factual basis easily satisfied Rule 11(b)(3)’s “low bar,” particularly given the plea agreement’s facts, Wilford’s affirmations, and the video evidence.
Her “actual innocence” argument was either an impermissible sufficiency challenge after a guilty plea (also barred by her appeal waiver) or a misunderstanding of “actual innocence” as a habeas gateway rather than a direct-appeal claim.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appellate timeliness and waiver of Rule 4(b)

United States v. Gaytan-Garza, 652 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
The court used this case to explain why it could hear Wilford’s appeal even though her notice of appeal was filed one day late under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). Gaytan-Garza stands for the principle that Rule 4(b)’s deadline is not jurisdictional and late filing does not require dismissal unless the government raises the issue. Here, the government waived any objection, so the panel reached the merits.

2. Plain-error framework and what “prejudice” means

United States v. Pitts, 997 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2021)
Pitts supplied multiple controlling standards: plain-error review applies to unpreserved Rule 11 challenges; a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and sworn plea-colloquy admissions generally bind the defendant. Pitts also supports that a written plea agreement’s factual narrative, acknowledged as accurate, can satisfy Rule 11(b)(3).
United States v. Betro, 115 F.4th 429 (6th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001)
These cases provided the four-part plain-error test, including the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation” prong. They frame the appellate lens as highly deferential absent preservation below.
United States v. Hobbs, 953 F.3d 853 (6th Cir. 2020) and Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016)
These authorities anchored the key prejudice inquiry: whether there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for the error, the result would have differed. In the guilty-plea context, that usually means whether the defendant would have declined the plea bargain. The court applied this framing to reject relief for the colloquy misstatement.

3. Appeal waivers and challenges that survive them

United States v. Detloff, 794 F.3d 588 (6th Cir. 2015), United States v. Atkinson, 354 F. App'x 250 (6th Cir. 2009), and In re Acosta, 480 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2007)
The panel relied on these to clarify that an appeal waiver does not block claims attacking the validity of the plea itself (e.g., whether the waiver/plea was knowing and voluntary or complied with Rule 11). This allowed Wilford’s Rule 11 and voluntariness challenges to be heard, even though her plea agreement included a waiver.

4. Record-bound appellate review

Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982) (and Fed. R. App. P. 10(a))
The court invoked these to reject reliance on factual assertions “outside the record.” This is important in plea-attack appeals, where defendants sometimes attempt to supplement the story with post hoc claims not presented to the district court.

5. What § 924(c) actually criminalizes

United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2004)
This case supplied the doctrinal core: § 924(c) contains two distinct prongs—(i) use or carry “during and in relation to” a predicate crime, and (ii) possess “in furtherance of” a predicate crime. The panel used Combs to establish that the district court misstated Wilford’s charged prong by adding “possessed” to the “use/carry” formulation.

6. Misdescribing § 924(c) elements: trial cases distinguished

United States v. Hunter, 558 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Castano, 543 F.3d 826 (6th Cir. 2008)
Wilford invoked these to argue the colloquy described a “nonexistent offense.” The panel distinguished them because they involved jury trials and more serious element confusion (mixing the “conduct” and “participation” aspects of § 924(c)). Here, the panel characterized the error as narrower: adding “possessed” while correctly stating “during and in relation to.” Because the posture was a guilty plea, the court emphasized the prejudice-to-the-plea-decision inquiry, which did not exist in Hunter and Castano.

7. Voluntariness and the binding effect of plea-colloquy admissions

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) and Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1986)
These cases reinforce the presumption of truthfulness and finality attached to sworn plea colloquy statements. The panel used them (via Pitts) to reject Wilford’s later claim that she was “forced” to plead guilty, because it contradicted her in-court assurances that she was not pressured.

8. Factual basis for the plea: a low evidentiary bar

United States v. Mobley, 618 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Short, 128 F.4th 823 (6th Cir. 2025)
These cases supplied the court’s key characterization of Rule 11(b)(3): it is a “low bar” requiring “some evidence,” not “strong evidence.” That framing was decisive in finding the plea’s factual basis sufficient, especially where Wilford expressly adopted the factual narrative and the record included video.
United States v. Baez, 87 F.3d 805 (6th Cir. 1996)
Baez (as quoted through Pitts) supports that a written plea agreement’s description of essential facts, expressly acknowledged by the defendant, can satisfy Rule 11(b)(3). The panel relied on this to treat Wilford’s acknowledgments as enough to establish the factual basis.

9. “Actual innocence” as habeas doctrine, not direct-appeal relief

Witham v. United States, 97 F.4th 1027 (6th Cir. 2024) and Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998)
The panel used these to cabin “actual innocence” to its doctrinal role: a gateway to excuse procedural default in collateral (habeas) proceedings. Wilford’s invocation of “actual innocence” on direct appeal therefore “has no role here,” and in any event her appeal waiver foreclosed a sufficiency challenge to “the determination of whether she is guilty.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Rule 11 element misstatement: error without reversible prejudice

The district court, while explaining the § 924(c) charge, told Wilford the government would have to prove she “used, carried, or possessed” a firearm “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime. The Sixth Circuit agreed this was a misstatement because “possessed” aligns with the separate statutory prong (“in furtherance”), not the charged “use/carry” prong.

The decisive move, however, was the court’s treatment of prejudice under plain-error review. The panel held Wilford did not show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, she would have rejected the plea. Two facts mattered:

The plea agreement itself contained a similar misstatement, making it difficult to attribute her decision to plead guilty to the judge’s oral phrasing alone.
On the record, Wilford’s conduct (on video) involved holding the gun—conduct that plainly fits “carrying” and also “possessing,” rendering the miswording practically non-outcome-determinative for her plea decision.

Importantly, the panel did not say Rule 11 mistakes are harmless as a general matter; it held that this defendant, on this record, failed to carry her burden on the “substantial rights” prong required for reversal.

2. Voluntariness: sworn colloquy answers control absent extraordinary showing

Wilford’s involuntariness argument centered on her claimed unfamiliarity with the system and her asserted belief (based on counsel’s advice) that she had no real option but to plead guilty to avoid a far longer sentence. The court treated this as incompatible with her sworn admissions that no one pressured her, that pleading was her decision, and that she had discussed options with counsel.

Under Blackledge, Baker, and Pitts, post-plea claims that contradict the plea colloquy are generally insufficient on direct appeal. The panel therefore found no error in the district court’s voluntariness determination.

3. Factual basis: Rule 11(b)(3) is satisfied by “some evidence,” and the plea record had more than that

The panel applied the “low bar” from Mobley and Short. The government read the factual basis aloud; Wilford confirmed it was “true and correct,” that she engaged in the attributed conduct, and that she had no corrections. The facts included that she went to the residence with a gun to protect illegal drugs from a potential robbery. Combined with the video evidence, the district court had ample “some evidence” to accept the plea.

4. “Actual innocence” and sufficiency: waived and doctrinally misplaced

The panel treated Wilford’s “actual innocence” presentation as functionally a sufficiency argument about the evidence on the dismissed and/or pleaded counts—an awkward fit because there was no trial verdict to test. Moreover, her plea agreement waived challenges to the “determination of whether she is guilty,” foreclosing a sufficiency attack.

To the extent she meant “actual innocence” in its technical sense, the panel held she misapprehended the doctrine: under Witham and Bousley, “actual innocence” operates as a habeas gateway, not a free-standing direct-appeal claim.

C. Impact

Rule 11 errors in § 924(c) pleas: prejudice is the battleground.
The decision underscores that even a conceded Rule 11 misstatement of a statutory element will not yield reversal under plain-error review absent a concrete showing that the error likely changed the defendant’s plea decision.
“Carry” vs. “possess” miswording may be practically non-prejudicial where the record shows both.
While doctrinally distinct under § 924(c), the panel treated the overlap in real-world conduct as relevant to whether the misstatement mattered to the defendant’s choice to plead.
Plea-colloquy finality remains robust on direct appeal.
The court’s reliance on colloquy admissions continues a strong Sixth Circuit trend: direct-appeal efforts to reframe the plea as coerced or uninformed face steep odds absent record support.
Clarifies limits of “actual innocence” language outside habeas.
Defendants frequently invoke “actual innocence” rhetorically on direct appeal; this decision reinforces that the doctrinal gateway belongs to collateral review and does not replace preserved appellate claims.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11 plea colloquy: The judge’s in-court checklist to ensure the defendant understands the charge, the rights being waived, and is pleading voluntarily, and that there is a factual basis for the plea.
§ 924(c) has two different firearm theories:
- Use or carry a gun “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence.
- Possess a gun “in furtherance of” such a crime (a different, typically more purpose-driven nexus).
Plain-error review: A demanding standard applied when the defendant did not object in the trial court. The defendant must show not only an error that is obvious, but also that it likely changed the outcome and seriously undermines the proceeding’s fairness.
“Substantial rights” (in plea cases): Usually means showing a reasonable probability the defendant would have not pleaded guilty if the error had not happened.
Appeal waiver: A contractual term in many plea agreements limiting what the defendant can appeal. Typically, it does not bar an argument that the plea itself was invalid, but it often does bar challenges to guilt or evidence.
“Actual innocence” (term of art): In federal post-conviction law, it is commonly a gateway to allow a habeas court to hear otherwise defaulted claims; it is not, by itself, a standard direct-appeal claim after a valid guilty plea.

V. Conclusion

United States v. JoiSade Wilford reinforces a practical rule for guilty-plea appeals in the Sixth Circuit: even where a district court inaccurately describes an element of a § 924(c) offense under Rule 11, the conviction will stand on plain-error review unless the defendant can show a reasonable probability that the misstatement changed the decision to plead guilty. The opinion also reaffirms the binding force of sworn plea-colloquy admissions, the low threshold for establishing a factual basis under Rule 11(b)(3), and the limited role of “actual innocence” outside habeas proceedings.