Limits on BIA Appellate Review: No New “Intent” Findings to Reverse Adjustment of Status Without IJ Factfinding

I. Introduction

In Taveras Martinez v. Blanche (1st Cir. Apr. 17, 2026), the First Circuit reviewed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that reversed an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) grant of adjustment of status to Johan Jose Taveras Martínez, a Venezuelan national married to a U.S. citizen and parent of a U.S. citizen child.

The central dispute was not whether the BIA could reweigh discretionary equities in the adjustment analysis, but whether the BIA crossed the regulatory line between (i) permissible de novo reweighing of undisputed facts and (ii) impermissible new factfinding. Specifically, the BIA treated Mr. Taveras Martínez’s presentation of a false driver’s license to police as being done “in order to avoid criminal prosecution”—a motive the IJ had not found and the record did not establish as undisputed.

The First Circuit held that this additional “intent” finding was impermissible appellate factfinding under the BIA’s own regulations and required reversal and remand.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court first confirmed jurisdiction despite the general bar on reviewing discretionary denials of adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), because the petition raised a “question of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D): whether the BIA applied the correct standard of review and whether it engaged in forbidden factfinding.

On the merits, the court emphasized that the IJ is the primary factfinder and that the BIA may not engage in factfinding on appeal except in limited circumstances. The BIA’s conclusion that petitioner provided false identification to police “in order to avoid criminal prosecution” was not supported by the materials the BIA cited (the IJ decision, hearing transcript, and a mitigation letter). The record showed petitioner repeatedly testified he obtained and used false documents “to work,” and the IJ found him credible.

Because the BIA’s dispositive adverse characterization rested on a disputed, unresolved issue of intent that the IJ had not found, the BIA exceeded its authority. The First Circuit therefore reversed and remanded for the BIA to reweigh equities without impermissible additions to the factual record.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Moreno v. Garland, 51 F.4th 40 (1st. Cir 2022): Cited by the Government for the proposition that discretionary adjustment decisions are generally unreviewable absent a colorable legal or constitutional claim. The First Circuit distinguished that bar by framing petitioner’s challenge as a legal error: the BIA’s use of the wrong standard of review / impermissible factfinding.
Perez-Trujillo v. Garland, 3 F.4th 10 (1st Cir. 2021): Used to confirm jurisdiction where a petition raises “questions of law” or where the BIA “departed from its settled course of adjudication” in making a discretionary determination. The court relied on it to treat standard-of-review compliance as a reviewable legal question.
Adeyanju v. Garland, 27 F.4th 25 (1st Cir. 2022): The opinion’s main structural precedent. It supplies (i) the regulatory division of labor between IJ factfinding and BIA review, (ii) the “dead fish” articulation of clear-error review, and (iii) the key distinction between reweighing undisputed facts and making new factual findings. The court quoted Adeyanju repeatedly to hold that the BIA must explain why an IJ finding is illogical/implausible rather than “substitute its own factual judgments.”
Peulic v. Garland, 22 F.4th 340 (1st Cir. 2022): Cited for the proposition that claims an agency applied the incorrect legal standard present reviewable questions of law.
Duncan v. Barr, 919 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2019) and Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012): Out-of-circuit support that whether the BIA applied the proper standard of review is a question of law, reinforcing jurisdiction.
Santos Garcia v. Garland, 67 F.4th 455 (1st Cir. 2023): Cited for de novo review of legal questions on petition for review.
Chen v. Holder, 703 F.3d 17 (1st. Cir. 2022) (as cited in the opinion): Used for the foundational proposition that the IJ has the “front-line duty of finding the facts,” anchoring the BIA’s constrained role.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) and Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54878-01, 54889 (Aug. 26, 2002): Provided the classic clear-error framing: BIA cannot reverse merely because it would weigh evidence differently.
Garcia-Botello v. Bondi, 168 F.4th 1245 (10th Cir. 2026): Cited for the principle that “intent” determinations are case-specific issues for the factfinder (the IJ), underscoring why the BIA’s inferred motive was problematic.
Padmore, 609 F.3d at 68 (as cited in the opinion): Quoted for the rule that reversal based on “disputed material facts” that the IJ did not resolve constitutes impermissible BIA factfinding.
Barros v. Garland, 31 F.4th 51 (1st Cir. 2022): Cited for the proposition that it is an error of law for the BIA to ignore its own regulations—supporting the conclusion that the BIA’s overreach was legal error.
Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2008): Used to distinguish permissible analysis of evidence in the immigration court from impermissibly “supplement[ing] the record.”
Aponte, 610 F.3d at 4 (as cited in the opinion): Cited generally for the abuse-of-discretion/legal-error framing when the BIA exceeds its authority.
United States v. Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2003): Appears in a background footnote explaining B1 visas; not central to the standard-of-review holding, but it supports the factual context (overstay underpinning removability).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction re-characterized as “legal error,” not “discretion”

The Government attempted to frame the dispute as an unreviewable challenge to the BIA’s discretionary balancing. The First Circuit instead focused on the predicate question: whether the BIA complied with the governing review framework in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3). That compliance question is a legal issue, bringing the petition within 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

2. The regulatory wall: clear-error review of facts vs de novo review of discretion

The opinion draws a bright line:

The BIA may review discretionary judgment de novo and may “assign various weights” to established facts (an idea also referenced in the Government’s reliance on Adeyanju v. Garland and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii)).
But the BIA may not create or resolve new factual propositions—especially where the new proposition turns on intent, credibility-adjacent inference, or a disputed interpretation of ambiguous conduct—without either (a) identifying clear error in an IJ’s factual finding, or (b) remanding for factfinding.

3. Why “to avoid criminal prosecution” mattered

The First Circuit treated the BIA’s phrase “in order to avoid criminal prosecution” as a consequential new finding (a motive/intent finding), not merely a rhetorical gloss. The court then performed a record-based check: none of the cited sources established that intent, while petitioner’s testimony established a different intent (“to work”) and was credited by the IJ.

Having found the intent proposition both (i) material to the BIA’s adverse-equities analysis and (ii) unsupported as an undisputed fact in the record, the court held the BIA effectively “supplement[ed] the record,” triggering the prohibition in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) and First Circuit precedent.

4. The remedy: remand, not affirmance on alternative balancing

The court did not attempt to salvage the BIA decision by reweighing equities itself or by treating the impermissible factfinding as harmless. Instead, it required the BIA to reweigh the case “without impermissible additions.” This reinforces that the integrity of the IJ/BIA factfinding structure is not optional housekeeping—it is a condition of lawful adjudication.

C. Impact

Constrains BIA “intent” narratives in discretionary reversals. The decision signals that when the BIA reverses an IJ’s discretionary grant by attributing a sharpened motive (e.g., “to evade prosecution,” “to deceive authorities,” “to exploit benefits”), it must be able to point to an IJ finding or an undisputed record basis. Otherwise, the BIA must remand.
Strengthens judicial review through the “question of law” gateway. The case adds to the First Circuit’s line holding that standard-of-review misapplication is reviewable even when the underlying relief is discretionary, preserving meaningful oversight under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Practical litigation effect: build/contest motive evidence at the IJ stage. For DHS and respondents alike, the decision highlights that motive and intent are fact issues best developed before the IJ (direct testimony, cross-examination, documentary support). If left ambiguous, the BIA may be unable to “complete” the narrative on appeal.
Institutional discipline: reinforces remand as the proper tool. The opinion normalizes remand—rather than appellate improvisation—when a discretionary decision would turn on unresolved factual propositions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjustment of status: A discretionary process allowing certain noncitizens already in the U.S. to become lawful permanent residents. Even if eligible, an applicant can be denied as a matter of discretion after balancing positive and negative factors.
Clear-error review: A highly deferential standard. The BIA cannot overturn the IJ’s factual determinations just because it would view the evidence differently; it must be firmly convinced a mistake occurred (captured in the opinion’s “dead fish” metaphor drawn from Adeyanju v. Garland).
De novo review (for discretion/judgment): The BIA can reweigh how much the established facts matter (e.g., whether a past event should count as a big or small negative factor). But it cannot invent additional facts.
Impermissible factfinding: When the BIA decides a factual issue the IJ did not decide—especially an issue that depends on credibility, intent, or disputed inference—rather than remanding to the IJ to find the facts.
“Question of law” jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D): Even when courts cannot review the merits of discretionary decisions, they can review legal errors—like applying the wrong standard of review or violating regulations governing the appellate process.

V. Conclusion

Taveras Martinez v. Blanche reinforces a concrete appellate constraint: the BIA may not reverse an IJ’s grant of adjustment of status by adding a new, material finding about the applicant’s intent—here, that he used false identification “in order to avoid criminal prosecution”—when that intent was not found by the IJ and is not established as an undisputed fact in the record. The proper course is remand for factfinding, not appellate reconstruction of motive.

In the broader legal context, the decision strengthens the IJ’s role as primary factfinder, preserves the integrity of the clear-error standard, and ensures that discretionary immigration adjudication remains bounded by the procedural and regulatory guarantees that make judicial review meaningful.