Seriousness of Supervised-Release Violation Conduct May Support a New Supervised-Release Term; § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s “Offense Seriousness” Bar Targets Only the Underlying Conviction

Introduction

In United States v. Kennedy (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2026) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirmed the revocation sentence imposed on defendant-appellant Jamel Kennedy, whose supervised release was revoked in the Southern District of New York (Preska, J.). The district court imposed nine months’ imprisonment followed by an additional five-year term of supervised release.

The appeal presented a focused procedural challenge: Kennedy argued the district court erred by relying “exclusively” on the seriousness of the conduct underlying his supervised-release violation when imposing the new supervised-release term, contending such reliance is impermissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (which incorporates some, but not all, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors). He relied principally on Tapia v. United States and United States v. Williams.

Although labeled a “SUMMARY ORDER” and expressly nonprecedential under the Second Circuit’s rules, the decision is a useful synthesis of how the § 3583(c)/§ 3553(a) framework applies in the revocation setting, particularly after the Supreme Court’s clarification of what “offense” means in United States v. Esteras.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit applied plain-error review because Kennedy did not raise the objection below.
The court rejected the claim that § 3583(c) bars consideration of “seriousness” in this context, explaining that the omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor (seriousness of the “offense”/retribution) concerns the underlying criminal conviction, not the violation conduct that triggers revocation.
Citing circuit precedent, the court reiterated that district courts may consider the seriousness of the violation conduct when imposing a revocation sentence, including a new term of supervised release.
The court further held that the district court did not rely “exclusively” on seriousness; it also discussed rehabilitation, deterrence, and protection of the public—factors expressly contemplated by § 3583(c).
The judgment revoking supervised release and imposing the prison term plus five years’ supervision was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standards of Review and Sentencing Framework

United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2020), provided two foundational principles used by the panel: (i) sentencing decisions are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, but (ii) unpreserved objections are reviewed only for plain error. The court also cited Smith for the proposition that a “far lower degree of specificity” is required when explaining a revocation sentence than at an original post-conviction sentencing.

United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2019), was used to state the Second Circuit’s four-prong formulation of the plain-error test.

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009), reinforced that satisfying all four plain-error prongs is “difficult,” setting the tone for why Kennedy’s unpreserved argument faced a high bar.

United States v. Brooks, 889 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2018), supplied the general principle that revocation sentences are reviewed for “reasonableness,” aligning revocation review with ordinary sentencing review.

2) The § 3583(c) / § 3553(a) Issue: “Seriousness” and Retribution Limits

United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2021), and Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011), were central to Kennedy’s argument. Both decisions recognize that § 3583(c) omits § 3553(a)(2)(A), meaning that “retribution” (e.g., punishing the seriousness of the underlying criminal conviction) is not an authorized basis for imposing a term of supervised release. Williams further suggests that if incarceration is based substantially on seriousness, a court should separately state reasons for supervised release—because seriousness is permissible for imprisonment but not for supervised release.

The panel’s key move was to limit Tapia/Williams to the context they address: the underlying conviction. This limitation was anchored in United States v. Esteras, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), which the panel cited for the proposition that § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s reference to “offense” can mean only the underlying criminal conviction, not the supervised-release violation conduct. Esteras thus served as a clarifying bridge: it preserved Tapia’s retribution bar for supervised release while simultaneously narrowing the category of “seriousness” that is forbidden (seriousness of the original “offense,” not seriousness of the violation conduct).

3) Revocation-Specific Authority: Seriousness of Violation Conduct Is Fair Game

Having cabined Tapia and Williams, the panel relied on longstanding Second Circuit revocation jurisprudence: United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020), which in turn quoted United States v. Edwards, 834 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2016). Ramos states that although revocation primarily sanctions the defendant’s “breach of trust,” that principle does not bar a district court from considering the seriousness of the violation conduct—“Of course it can.”

This line of cases supplies the doctrinal foundation for the panel’s holding: revocation is not solely an abstract “trust” inquiry; courts may assess the real-world nature and danger of the violation behavior when selecting an appropriate sanction and supervision plan.

4) Supervised Release as Protection and Deterrence

United States v. Alvarado, 720 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2013), was cited for the proposition that supervised release can provide an “added measure of deterrence and protection [of the public].” The panel also referenced United States v. Williams again for the point that supervised release may be justified by forward-looking protective aims (there, protecting children).

Legal Reasoning

Preservation and standard of review drove the posture. Because the objection was not raised in the district court, Kennedy had to show a clear/obvious error affecting substantial rights and undermining the integrity of proceedings. This framing made it insufficient for Kennedy to show that another judge might have explained the sentence differently; he had to show the district court’s approach was plainly unlawful.
The court distinguished “offense” from “violation.” The opinion treats the statutory omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness/punishment/retribution) as a targeted constraint tied to the “offense,” which, under Esteras, means the underlying conviction. Therefore, the prohibition on considering “seriousness” when imposing supervised release is a prohibition on considering the seriousness of the original crime as retribution—not a prohibition on assessing the seriousness of the supervised-release violation conduct.
Revocation’s “breach of trust” principle is not exclusive. Drawing on Ramos and Edwards, the court emphasized that sanctioning breach of trust is “primary,” but it does not exclude considering the violation’s seriousness. That matters in practical terms because revocation often arises from conduct presenting immediate risk (e.g., violence), and supervision conditions/length are tools for risk management and behavioral change.
The record reflected multiple § 3583(c) purposes. The panel rejected the characterization that the district court relied “exclusively” on seriousness. It pointed to record statements reflecting:
- Rehabilitation (anger management and curbing violence, particularly with a domestic partner);
- Specific deterrence and a “forward-looking” goal of teaching a “hard lesson” necessary for reintegration;
- Protection of the public by maintaining oversight and tools for intervention if further violations occur.
Those rationales fit comfortably within § 3583(c)’s incorporated § 3553(a) factors (e.g., deterrence, protection, treatment).
No separate, hyper-detailed supervised-release explanation was required here. Citing Williams, the panel reiterated that once the court explains the basis for the sentence, it need not provide a separate basis for supervised release, and Smith confirms that revocation explanations can be less elaborate than original sentencings. On this record, the explanation was “ample.”

Impact

While the order is nonprecedential, its reasoning highlights several practical implications for revocation litigation in the Second Circuit:

Tapia/Williams objections must be precisely targeted. After Esteras (and as applied here), defendants arguing that a court improperly relied on “seriousness” must clarify whose seriousness is at issue: seriousness of the underlying conviction (potentially barred as a supervised-release rationale) versus seriousness of the violation conduct (generally permissible in revocation).
“Seriousness” can legitimately inform both custody and supervision in revocation. Courts may treat the nature of the violation— especially violent conduct and disobedience of no-contact orders—as relevant to deterrence, treatment needs, and public safety, which are expressly recognized supervised-release goals.
Preservation remains crucial. Because unpreserved challenges are reviewed for plain error, defendants seeking to limit the district court’s reliance on certain rationales should object at sentencing to ensure abuse-of-discretion review rather than the far stricter plain-error standard.
Revocation explanation requirements remain comparatively modest. The order reinforces that courts are afforded latitude in revocation explanations so long as the record reflects consideration of appropriate statutory factors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release: A period of court-ordered monitoring after imprisonment. Conditions can require treatment, prohibit contact with certain people, and mandate reporting. Violations can lead to revocation and additional imprisonment and supervision.
Revocation sentence: The punishment imposed after a court finds a defendant violated supervised release. It may include imprisonment and a new term of supervision.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors: The general sentencing considerations (e.g., deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation). One factor—§ 3553(a)(2)(A)—addresses retribution (seriousness/punishment for the “offense”).
18 U.S.C. § 3583(c): The statute directing what a court considers when imposing supervised release. It incorporates many § 3553(a) factors but notably omits § 3553(a)(2)(A), limiting retributive reliance when setting supervised release.
“Offense” vs. “violation conduct”: “Offense” refers to the original conviction conduct; “violation conduct” refers to what the defendant did to break supervised-release conditions. Under Esteras as applied here, § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retribution focus on the “offense” concerns the underlying conviction, not the violation conduct.
Plain error: A stringent appellate standard for issues not raised below: the error must be clear, affect substantial rights, and seriously affect the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
“Breach of trust”: A revocation concept emphasizing that supervised-release violations are serious because they break the court’s trust. In the Second Circuit, this is a primary lens but not an exclusive one; courts may still consider how dangerous or serious the violation was.

Conclusion

United States v. Kennedy affirms that, in the revocation context, a district court may consider the seriousness of the supervised-release violation conduct when imposing a new term of supervised release. The decision distinguishes Tapia and Williams by clarifying—consistent with United States v. Esteras—that § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s “seriousness of the offense” concept speaks to the underlying criminal conviction, not the violation conduct triggering revocation. On this record, the district court also relied on expressly permissible, forward-looking factors—rehabilitation, deterrence, and public protection—so no plain error occurred.