Explicit Appeal Waivers Bar Second Amendment Attacks on § 922(g)(1) Convictions and Substantive-Reasonableness Sentencing Appeals

Introduction

In United States v. Mitchell (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2026) (summary order), Joseph Mitchell pleaded guilty in the Northern District of New York to (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and (2) possessing firearms as a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court imposed 135 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.

On appeal, Mitchell sought (i) vacatur of his § 922(g)(1) conviction on the ground that the “felon-in-possession statute violates the Second Amendment,” and (ii) review of the substantive reasonableness of his within-Guidelines 135-month sentence. The government responded that both arguments were foreclosed by an appeal waiver in Mitchell’s plea agreement. The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal.

Note: The court issued a summary order, which the Second Circuit states “do[es] not have precedential effect,” though it reflects the court’s continuing approach to enforcing plea-agreement waivers under existing circuit law.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit held that Mitchell’s appeal waiver was enforceable and covered both of his appellate claims. Applying de novo review to the plea agreement, the panel found no basis to treat the waiver as unenforceable because Mitchell did not argue (and nothing suggested) that he entered the agreement unknowingly, involuntarily, or incompetently. Nor did he identify extraordinary circumstances—such as a fundamental-rights violation in sentencing—that would justify refusing enforcement.

The waiver’s text was decisive: Mitchell waived (1) any appeal or collateral attack of any imprisonment term of 135 months or less, and (2) “any claim” that the statutes of conviction were unconstitutional. Because those provisions squarely matched Mitchell’s Second Amendment challenge and his sentence challenge, the court dismissed the appeal.

In a footnote, the panel added that even if the waiver did not foreclose the § 922(g)(1) argument, the claim was “squarely foreclosed” on the merits by Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-269, 2026 WL 35708 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Appeal waivers are construed as contracts; enforceability is presumptive

United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2018): Plea agreements (including appeal waivers) are reviewed de novo and interpreted under contract principles; ambiguities are construed strictly against the government.
United States v. Lajeunesse, 85 F.4th 679, 692–93 (2d Cir. 2023): Appeal waivers are “presumptively enforceable” if entered knowingly, voluntarily, and competently; voiding waivers requires a high bar, partly to protect plea bargaining as a meaningful negotiation process.

2) Exceptions exist but are “circumscribed,” focused on fundamental-right violations or unanticipated sentencing processes

United States v. Riggi, 649 F.3d 143, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2011): Courts may decline enforcement where fundamental rights are violated (e.g., reliance on race or naturalized status at sentencing); central inquiry includes whether the sentence was reached in a manner unanticipated by the plea agreement.
United States v. Burden, 860 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2017): Discusses four recognized grounds for deeming an appeal waiver unenforceable.
United States v. Lutchman, 910 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2018): Identifies an additional ground for possible unenforceability.
United States v. Thompson, 143 F.4th 169, 182 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Borden, 16 F.4th 351, 354–55 (2d Cir. 2021)): Reiterates the narrowness of exceptions to enforcement.
United States v. Monzon, 359 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2004): Places the burden on defendants to show that a right is “so fundamental” it is unwaivable; also supports enforcing waivers where merits cannot be determined on the appellate record.

3) A guilty plea differs from an appeal waiver; constitutional claims can be waived by agreement

United States v. Alarcon Sanchez, 972 F.3d 156, 166 n.3 (2d Cir. 2020): Cited by Mitchell for the proposition that certain constitutional challenges may be raised on appeal despite a guilty plea—but the panel distinguished that from a case involving an explicit waiver of appellate rights.
Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 238 (2019) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009), and United States v. Hardman, 778 F.3d 896, 899 (11th Cir. 2014)): Reaffirms that plea bargains are contracts and preclude challenges within their scope.
United States v. Ojeda, 946 F.3d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 2020): A knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal a sentence is presumptively enforceable.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970): Recognizes the validity of “[w]aivers of constitutional rights” in the plea context.

4) Waivers foreclose substantive-reasonableness challenges to sentences within the waiver cap

United States v. Morgan, 386 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993)): A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal of a certain sentence cannot appeal a sentence conforming to the agreement; allowing it would render plea bargaining “meaningless.”

5) Merits backdrop for § 922(g)(1) Second Amendment claims (not reached)

Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-269, 2026 WL 35708 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026): Cited to show that even absent waiver, Mitchell’s Second Amendment challenge would fail in this Circuit.

Legal Reasoning

Framework: contract-like enforcement with narrow safety valves. The panel began from the Second Circuit’s settled position that appeal waivers are generally enforceable when knowingly and voluntarily made (United States v. Green; United States v. Lajeunesse), with exceptions limited to extraordinary circumstances implicating fundamental rights or departures from the anticipated sentencing process (United States v. Riggi; United States v. Burden; United States v. Lutchman).
Burden on the defendant. Mitchell bore the burden of showing that the implicated right was “so fundamental” that it is unwaivable “under all circumstances” (United States v. Monzon). He did not attempt that showing; he relied instead on a generic claim about constitutional challenges surviving guilty pleas.
Critical distinction: guilty plea vs. appellate waiver. The panel rejected Mitchell’s reliance on the idea that a guilty plea alone does not foreclose constitutional claims (United States v. Alarcon Sanchez), because Mitchell’s obstacle was not the plea; it was the express waiver of appeal and constitutional challenges in the agreement. The opinion grounded this in the contract conception of plea agreements (Garza v. Idaho; Puckett v. United States; United States v. Hardman) and in the accepted permissibility of waiving constitutional rights (Brady v. United States).
Textual match between waiver and claims. The court treated the waiver language as unambiguous and directly on point: Mitchell waived any appeal/collateral attack of “any term of imprisonment of 135 months or less,” and separately waived any claim that the statutes of conviction were unconstitutional. Those clauses precisely covered (a) his substantive-reasonableness challenge to a 135-month sentence, and (b) his Second Amendment attack on § 922(g)(1).
Consideration: Mitchell received bargained-for benefits. The court emphasized that Mitchell obtained meaningful concessions, including the government’s promise not to bring additional federal charges based on the described conduct and not to seek a 180-month statutory minimum based on prior convictions. Enforcing the waiver thus preserved the bargain’s integrity, echoing the policy rationale in United States v. Morgan and United States v. Salcido-Contreras.

Impact

Reinforces the breadth of negotiated appellate waivers. The decision underscores that, in the Second Circuit, defendants can—and often do—waive not only sentencing appeals but also constitutional challenges to statutes of conviction when the plea agreement explicitly says so.
Channels Second Amendment litigation into negotiation and preservation choices. For defendants contemplating post-plea Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1), the practical message is that the ability to litigate such issues on appeal may depend on securing a carveout during plea negotiations.
Encourages precision in drafting and Rule 11 practice. Prosecutors have an incentive to draft waivers with clear coverage (including constitutional claims), while defense counsel must ensure clients understand that such clauses may shut down even high-profile, evolving constitutional arguments.
Substantive-reasonableness review is effectively unavailable within the waiver cap. Where the sentence imposed equals or falls below the agreed cap, the defendant’s ability to seek reasonableness review is largely extinguished absent exceptional circumstances.
Merits baseline remains important. The footnote citing Zherka v. Bondi signals that, even beyond waiver doctrine, Second Amendment attacks on § 922(g)(1) face an additional merits barrier in the Second Circuit (at least as of the cited authorities).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Appeal waiver: A clause in a plea agreement where a defendant agrees not to appeal (and often not to file later collateral challenges) as to specified issues—commonly the sentence, and sometimes even the constitutionality of the statutes of conviction.
Collateral attack: A later challenge to a conviction or sentence outside the direct appeal—typically via habeas-type motions—often included in waiver language alongside “appeal.”
Substantive reasonableness: A form of appellate review asking whether the length of a sentence is reasonable in light of statutory factors. Here, that review was unavailable because Mitchell agreed not to appeal any prison term of 135 months or less.
De novo review: The appellate court reviews an issue from scratch, without deferring to the district court. The Second Circuit applies de novo review to interpreting plea agreements and waivers.
“Fundamental rights” exception: A narrow category of circumstances where the court will refuse to enforce a waiver—e.g., where sentencing is infected by constitutionally intolerable considerations such as race, or where the process produced results outside what the plea bargain contemplated.
Statutory minimum: The lowest prison term allowed by statute for a given offense. The opinion notes that Mitchell’s plea bargain included a government commitment not to seek a higher minimum (180 months) based on prior convictions—part of the “benefit of the bargain.”

Conclusion

United States v. Mitchell is a straightforward but consequential application of Second Circuit waiver doctrine: when a defendant knowingly and voluntarily signs a plea agreement that (i) caps appeal rights for a specified sentence range and (ii) expressly waives constitutional challenges to the statutes of conviction, the court will enforce that bargain absent truly extraordinary circumstances. The decision also signals—through its citation to Zherka v. Bondi—that even without a waiver, Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) face steep headwinds in this Circuit. In practical terms, Mitchell highlights that the availability of appellate review on constitutional and sentencing issues is often determined not at briefing, but at the negotiating table.