Extortion Is Not “Family-Group” Persecution Without Evidence of Animus or Targeting Beyond a Means-to-an-End

1. Introduction

In Xivir-Ixtos v. Blanche (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2026) (summary order), Petitioners Ingrid Azucena Xivir-Ixtos and her two minor children—natives and citizens of Guatemala—sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection.

The core dispute concerned nexus: whether the feared harm from extortionate threats was “on account of” a protected ground—here, asserted membership in a particular social group consisting of her family or her husband’s family—rather than ordinary criminal motives. The petition also referenced political opinion and CAT theories, which the court held were not properly preserved.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. It held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that Petitioners failed to prove the required nexus between the threatened harm and a protected ground. The court emphasized that the record supported the inference that the threats were driven by ordinary criminal extortion—a demand for money— not animus toward, or targeting because of, family membership.

The court also held that the political opinion and CAT claims were unexhausted and abandoned because they were not properly presented to the BIA and/or adequately briefed on petition for review.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005) and Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005): The court relied on these cases for the review framework—reviewing the IJ decision as modified and supplemented by the BIA.
• Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018): Cited for the standards of review—fact-finding under substantial evidence, legal questions de novo. This framing mattered because the panel treated the nexus determination as a fact-intensive call entitled to deference absent a compelled contrary conclusion.
• Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022): Central to the nexus analysis. The court used Quituizaca to (1) apply the asylum “one central reason” causation standard to withholding, and (2) reinforce that a protected ground cannot be “incidental or tangential” when gang violence is plausibly explained by criminal incentives.
• Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2005): Cited for the requirement that the applicant show—by direct or circumstantial evidence—that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from a protected ground. This case supplied the “motive” lens the court used to treat extortion as insufficient absent evidence of protected-ground motivation.
• Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F. 3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999): Cited for the longstanding principle that general crime and violence are not, by themselves, grounds for asylum/withholding. The panel deployed this principle to classify the threats as ordinary criminality.
• Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752 (2d Cir. 2022): The key family-based PSG nexus authority. The panel emphasized that even if a family is a cognizable group, targeting a family member “simply as a means to an end” (especially an end unconnected to a protected ground) does not establish nexus.
• Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2006): Cited to confirm that nexus determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence. This reinforced deference to the agency’s inference that extortion, not family status, motivated the threats.
• Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2007): Used to underscore that choosing among competing inferences is “within the province of the trier of fact.” The IJ’s inference—caller sought money and did not truly know the husband’s whereabouts—was therefore entitled to deference.
• Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007): Cited for the proposition that harm motivated purely by wealth is not persecution. The panel analogized the extortion demand to wealth-motivated harm rather than protected-ground persecution.
• Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021) and Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008): Both reinforce the substantial evidence framework and the idea that, where the petitioner bears the burden, failure to adduce evidence can itself support the agency’s decision. This mattered because the record lacked evidence connecting the assailant with a machete to the extortion calls or to family animus.
• Vera Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114 (2d Cir. 2024) and Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023): These cases supplied the doctrines of issue exhaustion and abandonment. The court relied on them to dispose of the political opinion and CAT theories as not properly preserved.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Governing nexus rule (“one central reason”): The court applied 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) and, via Quituizaca v. Garland, the same “one central reason” standard to withholding under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Petitioners therefore had to show family membership was not a minor or tangential factor, but a central motive for the threatened harm.
2. Extortion facts supported a criminal-motive inference: The record described three calls from a person claiming to hold the husband (who was in the United States) and threatening to kill Xivir-Ixtos and her children unless she paid. The court highlighted evidence that: (a) she told a psychologist extortion calls were typical gang behavior, and (b) the caller did not appear to know who or where the husband was. Under Siewe v. Gonzales, the IJ could reasonably infer the threats were a money-making scheme rather than family-based persecution.
3. “Means-to-an-end” targeting does not establish family PSG nexus: Invoking Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, the court reiterated that even if a family is a cognizable particular social group, targeting a family member as leverage—without evidence the family relationship is itself a central reason for harm— is insufficient, especially where the “end” is ordinary criminal gain.
4. Other feared harm lacked identifying or connecting evidence: Xivir-Ixtos also testified that a man chased her and her children with a machete after a bus broke down. The court held there was no evidence he knew who they were or that he was linked to the extortion threats. Under the substantial evidence standard (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)), the record did not compel a contrary conclusion.
5. Procedural defaults (unexhausted/abandoned claims): The court held political opinion and CAT arguments were unexhausted and abandoned under Vera Punin v. Garland and Debique v. Garland, limiting review to the preserved family-PSG nexus issue.

C. Impact

Although designated a summary order and expressly “non-precedential,” the decision reflects and reinforces an increasingly consistent Second Circuit approach in gang/extortion cases:

• Family PSG claims rise or fall on motive evidence: Applicants must produce evidence that family status—not merely a convenient pressure point—was a central motive. General references to gangs, threats, or family connection will not suffice without facts indicating animus, selective targeting, or protected-ground reasons.
• Extortion is treated as paradigmatic “ordinary criminal motive” absent more: Demands for money, especially with signs of opportunism (e.g., caller lacks true knowledge of the supposed hostage), are likely to be characterized as non-protected criminality under Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, Melgar de Torres v. Reno, and Quituizaca v. Garland.
• Procedural rigor in immigration appeals: The disposition underscores that petitioners must preserve issues before the BIA and brief them adequately to the court, or they will be dismissed as unexhausted/abandoned.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Nexus: The required causal link between the harm feared and a protected reason (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group). It is not enough that harm occurred; it must be because of the protected ground.
• “One central reason”: The protected ground must be a main driver of the persecution—not a minor or incidental factor.
• Particular social group (family): A family can qualify as a “particular social group,” but the applicant must still show the persecutor targeted them because they are part of that family, not merely to extract money or accomplish a non-protected goal.
• Substantial evidence review: The court does not reweigh facts; it upholds the agency unless the record would force any reasonable adjudicator to decide the other way.
• Issue exhaustion / abandonment: If an argument is not properly presented to the BIA (exhausted) and then meaningfully argued in the court brief (not abandoned), the court generally will not decide it.

5. Conclusion

Xivir-Ixtos v. Blanche affirms that, even when an applicant frames threats through a family-based particular social group, asylum and withholding fail without evidence that family membership was a central motive for the persecutor. Where the record supports an inference of ordinary criminal extortion—and where additional incidents lack proof of identification or connection— the Second Circuit will defer to the agency’s nexus finding under the substantial evidence standard. The decision also highlights the practical importance of preserving and briefing all grounds for relief to avoid findings of non-exhaustion or abandonment.