Independent “Lone-Wolf” Terrorism Is Not “Material Support” Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B Absent Direction/Control or Coordination

Case: United States v. Ullah (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2026)  |  Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Akayed Ullah’s December 11, 2017 attack in Manhattan, where he deflagrated a homemade pipe bomb in an underground tunnel connecting the Times Square/42nd Street subway station and the Port Authority Bus Terminal. A jury convicted him on six terrorism-related counts. On appeal, Ullah challenged three convictions: (i) providing material support to ISIS under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Count One), (ii) committing a terrorist attack against mass transportation systems under 18 U.S.C. § 1992(a)(2) (Count Five), and (iii) using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Six). He also attacked his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The panel confronted three interpretive questions with broader significance beyond the facts: (1) whether a “lone-wolf” attack inspired by ISIS propaganda constitutes “material support” to ISIS under § 2339B; (2) whether “placing” a destructive device “in, upon, or near” a mass transportation vehicle under § 1992(a)(2) includes carrying a device strapped to one’s body onto a train; and (3) whether the completed bombing offense in 18 U.S.C. § 2332f(a)(1) qualifies as a “crime of violence” to support § 924(c), and how to treat possible alternative-predicate error under Yates v. United States.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The majority (Judge Pérez, joined by Judge Rakoff) affirmed Ullah’s convictions for the bombing-related counts and upheld the life sentences, but reversed the material-support conviction. The core of the decision is its narrow reading of § 2339B: the statute does not criminalize independent violence done with ideological affinity to an FTO; it criminalizes “material support” only when the defendant works “under [the] direction or control” of the group (for “personnel”) or provides a “service” “performed in coordination with, or at the direction of” the group.

For Count Five, the court held that “placing” a destructive device “in, upon, or near” a mass transportation vehicle includes boarding a subway while wearing the bomb, because the act of positioning oneself on the vehicle necessarily positions the strapped device there as well. It also rejected constructive-amendment arguments because the indictment’s subsection (a) plainly charged the § 1992(a)(2) placing theory independent of the “to wit” language in subsection (c).

For Count Six, the court held that § 2332f(a) is divisible (completed vs. attempt; and intent-to-kill/injure vs. intent-to-cause-extensive-destruction/major-economic-loss). Because the indictment/instructions/verdict did not specify which § 2332f alternative the jury found, the court analyzed whether at least one alternative is a valid “crime of violence.” It held the completed offense under § 2332f(a)(1)(A) qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A). Even assuming other alternatives might not qualify, any Yates v. United States error was harmless under plain-error review because the evidence that Ullah completed the violent bombing offense was overwhelming.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and how they drove the outcome)

A. Material support under § 2339B: coordination/direction is required

• Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
  Role: This is the decision’s fulcrum for Count One. The majority treats Humanitarian Law Project as establishing that “The statute reaches only material support coordinated with or under the direction of a designated foreign terrorist organization,” and that “service” means conduct “performed in coordination with, or at the direction of” an FTO, while independent advocacy (and, by extension, independent acts) is outside § 2339B’s scope. The majority uses this to hold that propaganda inspiration plus unilateral action is not “personnel” (because § 2339B(h) excludes those acting “entirely independently”) and not a “service” (because “service” cannot swallow the statutory carveout for independent actors).
• United States v. Wright, 937 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2019).
  Role: Cited to reinforce that coordination must be “with the terrorist organization itself” rather than merely with publicly available “strategy and tactics,” supporting the majority’s reading that passive alignment with propaganda is not enough.
• United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Pugh, 945 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Alebbini, 979 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2020).
  Role: Used by the majority to distinguish typical “personnel” prosecutions—joining, pledging, or traveling to join the organization—versus Ullah’s “lone-wolf” propaganda-inspired attack without operational relationship. The dissent relies on these same cases to argue that attempted submission to ISIS’s direction (even without direct contact) suffices.

B. “Placing” under § 1992(a)(2) and indictment integrity

• Delaware v. Pennsylvania, 598 U.S. 115 (2023).
  Role: Supplies the interpretive method for “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,” which the court applies to “places” to conclude that positioning oneself (and the strapped bomb) on the train is “placing” the device on the vehicle.
• United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
  Role: Frame the constitutional function of an indictment: notice and elements, supporting the constructive-amendment analysis.
• United States v. Khalupsky, 5 F.4th 279 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Dove, 884 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Frank, 156 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 1998).
  Role: Provide the Second Circuit’s test for constructive amendment—whether proof/instructions altered an essential element so it is uncertain the conviction was for conduct charged. Applied to reject Ullah’s claim because Count Five’s subsection (a) plainly encompassed § 1992(a)(2), and the “to wit” clause grammatically limited subsection (c).
• United States v. Sturdivant, 244 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1981).
  Role: Used to dispose of duplicity prejudice: special verdict and unanimity instructions cured risk of non-unanimity or concealment.

C. § 924(c), “crime of violence,” divisibility, and alternative-predicate error

• United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022).
  Role: Anchors the elements-clause focus: the “only relevant question” is what the statute “always requires the government to prove” as an element. Also supports divisibility logic by treating attempt and completion as distinct for Hobbs Act robbery analysis, which the court analogizes to § 2332f(a)’s structure.
• United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019).
  Role: Eliminates § 924(c)’s residual clause; forces analysis to proceed under the force clause, § 924(c)(3)(A).
• Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013).
  Role: Provide the divisibility/modified categorical approach architecture the court uses to treat § 2332f(a) as containing alternative crimes.
• United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018).
  Role: Supplies the Second Circuit’s definition of “physical force” (“force capable of causing physical pain or injury” to person or property) and the categorical approach’s method (“minimum criminal conduct necessary for conviction”).
• Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423 (2025).
  Role: Used to support the proposition that intentional causation of injury/death necessarily involves the “use” of physical force, strengthening the conclusion that § 2332f(a)(1)(A) qualifies.
• Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); United States v. Blaszczak, 56 F.4th 230 (2d Cir. 2022); United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2010).
  Role: Provide the rule and standards for alternative-theory/predicate error and harmlessness under plain-error review. The majority relies on these to conclude that even if the jury might have relied on an invalid predicate (e.g., attempt), the overwhelming evidence of the completed § 2332f(a)(1)(A) offense means no effect on substantial rights.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Count One: § 2339B does not reach independent ISIS-inspired violence

The majority’s statutory analysis begins with § 2339B’s incorporation of “material support or resources” and then focuses on two charged theories: “personnel” (including oneself) and “service.” For “personnel,” § 2339B(h) expressly limits prosecution: a person must provide individuals “to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control,” and the statute expressly excludes “[i]ndividuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives.”

From that text and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the majority distills a rule: propaganda inspiration plus unilateral execution—even if self-styled as “on behalf of ISIS”—does not establish working under ISIS’s “direction or control” or providing a coordinated/directed “service.” The court treats “direction or control” as requiring an operational relationship beyond passive consumption of mass-distributed exhortations. It emphasizes that ISIS neither knew of Ullah nor supervised him, and that accepting the government’s theory would erase Congress’s “entirely independent” carveout (because any actor advancing ISIS objectives must have learned those objectives from somewhere, including propaganda).

On “service,” the majority reads Humanitarian Law Project to foreclose equating independent conduct that benefits an FTO with a “service” to the FTO. It rejects a “benefit alone” approach, reasoning that such an interpretation would also potentially criminalize independent advocacy and would nullify the statute’s coordination/direction limits.

The dissent’s core disagreement is interpretive and evidentiary: it reads “direction” more broadly to include ISIS’s public calls to attack and argues “entirely independently” cannot be satisfied where the attacker was motivated by and acted in response to ISIS’s instruction. It accuses the majority of collapsing “direction” into “control,” and of failing to defer to the jury’s rational inference that Ullah acted under ISIS’s direction and provided a service to ISIS.

B. Count Five: “placing” includes wearing the device onto the vehicle; no constructive amendment

The court reads “places” in § 1992(a)(2) according to ordinary meaning: to “put or set” in a position. Ullah strapped the device to his chest and boarded the subway train. The court treats the “carrying vs. placing” distinction as immaterial because the device’s position is functionally the same as Ullah’s position; by positioning himself on the train, he positioned the device “in, upon, or near” the vehicle.

On constructive amendment, the court parses Count Five’s structure: subsections (a), (b), and (c) are distinct theories; the “to wit” clause appears within (c) and qualifies only (c). Because subsection (a) plainly charged placing a destructive device “in, upon, and near a mass transportation vehicle” (mirroring § 1992(a)(2)), the trial proof and instructions did not alter the charged offense.

C. Count Six: completed § 2332f(a)(1)(A) is a crime of violence; any Yates problem harmless

The court first finds § 2332f(a) divisible: (1) completed offenses in § 2332f(a)(1) versus attempts/conspiracies in § 2332f(a)(2), and (2) intent-to-kill/injure in § 2332f(a)(1)(A) versus intent-to-cause-extensive-destruction/major-economic-loss in § 2332f(a)(1)(B). Using the modified categorical approach, it then acknowledges that the indictment/instructions/verdict do not reveal which alternative the jury selected.

The court nonetheless holds that the completed offense under § 2332f(a)(1)(A) qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A) because delivering/placing/discharging/detonating an explosive device in a public place with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury necessarily involves, at minimum, the attempted use of physical force against persons or property. It emphasizes the statutory definition of “explosive” and the intent element, reinforced by Delligatti v. United States.

Finally, even assuming some alternatives (e.g., attempt, or the property-destruction prong) might not qualify, the court applies Yates v. United States and plain-error harmlessness principles: the evidence of the completed public-use bombing with intent to seriously injure others was overwhelming and uncontested, so any alternative-predicate ambiguity did not affect substantial rights.

3.3. Impact

A. Material-support prosecutions involving “inspired” violence

The most consequential doctrinal shift is the majority’s narrow construction of § 2339B as applied to domestic “inspired” terrorism: unilateral violence intended to advance an FTO’s aims, without operational coordination or direction/control relationship, is insufficient for “personnel” or “service.” Practically, the decision pressures prosecutors to (i) develop evidence of coordination, direction, or attempted submission to organizational command, or (ii) rely on other terrorism statutes (many of which already carried Ullah’s life sentences) rather than § 2339B when dealing with propaganda-inspired attackers.

The decision also raises pleading and proof implications: where § 2339B is charged under “personnel” or “service,” the government may need to prove more than ideological alignment and public exhortations—e.g., communications, tasking, operational guidance, recruiting interactions, travel/joining steps, or other indicia of direction/control.

B. Mass transportation sabotage: broad reading of “places”

For § 1992(a)(2), the ruling clarifies that “placing” is not limited to leaving an object behind; it covers carrying a destructive device onto a vehicle when the device is affixed to one’s person. This reading may be invoked in future cases involving wearable devices, concealed explosives, or other on-person placement scenarios in mass transit settings.

C. § 924(c) predicates involving bombing statutes and verdict ambiguity

The decision contributes to post-United States v. Taylor litigation over attempt predicates and alternative-theory verdicts. It (i) treats § 2332f(a) as divisible, (ii) holds the completed § 2332f(a)(1)(A) offense is a “crime of violence,” and (iii) illustrates how courts may affirm § 924(c) convictions despite alternative-predicate uncertainty when the record makes the qualifying predicate effectively inevitable.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Material support” (§ 2339B): A crime for giving certain kinds of help (including “personnel” or “service”) to a designated foreign terrorist organization. This opinion stresses that the help must be coordinated with, or done under the organization’s direction/control—not merely “inspired” by it.
• “Personnel” (§ 2339B(h)): Not just “being sympathetic” or acting in parallel with a group’s goals. The statute requires providing someone (even yourself) “to work under” the group’s “direction or control,” and it expressly excludes those acting “entirely independently.”
• “Service” (as construed in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project): Work done “in coordination with, or at the direction of” the group; the majority rejects treating unilateral acts as “service” merely because they benefit the group.
• Constructive amendment: A constitutional problem where the trial proof or jury instructions effectively change what the grand jury charged, creating uncertainty whether the conviction rests on uncharged conduct.
• Categorical approach / modified categorical approach: Methods for deciding whether a prior or predicate offense counts as a “crime of violence” by looking at statutory elements, not the defendant’s actual conduct; the “modified” version applies when the statute lists alternative crimes (is “divisible”).
• Yates v. United States error: When a jury is instructed on two alternative legal theories and one is invalid, and it’s unclear which theory the jury used. Under plain-error/harmlessness doctrines, the conviction can still stand if the record shows the jury would have convicted on a valid theory anyway.
• Deflagration vs. detonation: A technical explosives distinction; the court treats it as legally immaterial here for the statutory terms “discharge”/“detonate.”

5. Conclusion

United States v. Ullah draws a sharp doctrinal line for § 2339B: the Second Circuit held that an ISIS-inspired, self-directed bombing—without proof of coordination or working under ISIS’s direction/control—does not constitute providing “personnel” or a “service” to ISIS, requiring reversal of the material-support conviction. At the same time, the court adopted a practical reading of “placing” a device on mass transportation that encompasses wearing a bomb onto a train, and it strengthened § 924(c) doctrine by holding the completed § 2332f(a)(1)(A) bombing offense is categorically a “crime of violence,” while demonstrating how alternative-predicate ambiguity may be cured by overwhelming evidence under Yates v. United States harmlessness principles. The dissent underscores that the major fault line is how expansively “direction” and “service” should be read in the era of propaganda-driven “inspired” attacks—a question likely to shape future terrorism prosecutions within the Circuit.