ADA Title III Standing Requires Past Denial and Plausible Future Use; Dissatisfaction with an Accommodation Process Is Not Discrimination

Introduction

In Abadi v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (2d Cir. Apr. 20, 2026) (summary order), plaintiff-appellant Aaron Abadi, proceeding pro se, sued Greyhound Lines, Inc. for allegedly failing to accommodate his disability during the COVID-19 pandemic, when mask mandates were in effect. Abadi asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).

The central issues on appeal were whether Abadi had Article III standing to pursue ADA Title III injunctive relief, and whether his pleadings plausibly stated claims for civil-rights conspiracy and disability discrimination—particularly where Greyhound allegedly provided a path to seek an accommodation, but Abadi declined to pursue it. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on standing, timeliness, and failure-to-state-a-claim grounds.

Note: The Second Circuit issued a summary order, which “do[es] not have precedential effect,” but it reflects the court’s application of established Second Circuit standards to a COVID-era disability-accommodation dispute.

Summary of the Opinion

ADA Title III: Abadi lacked standing because he did not plead a past injury (no denial of service or refusal of accommodation), and he did not plausibly plead a likelihood of future injury (mask mandate not in effect; future intent to use Greyhound not plausibly alleged).
§ 1985(3) and § 1986: Abadi did not plausibly allege a conspiracy; consequently the § 1986 claim failed because it must be predicated on a valid § 1985 claim.
Rehabilitation Act § 504: Abadi did not plausibly allege exclusion or discrimination “because of” disability; Greyhound allegedly provided instructions for obtaining an exemption, and Abadi’s dissatisfaction with the process did not amount to discrimination.
NYSHRL/NYCHRL: The court affirmed dismissal for substantially the reasons given by the district court.
NJ LAD: The LAD claim was time-barred.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standing and ADA Title III injunctive relief

The court’s standing analysis follows a well-established Second Circuit framework that links Title III’s remedial scheme (injunctions, not damages) to Article III requirements (past injury and a real likelihood of future injury):

Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2004): The order reiterates that Title III private plaintiffs may obtain only injunctive relief, not damages—making forward-looking injury essential.
Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd., 36 F.4th 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2022): The court applies Calcano’s three-part injury-in-fact inquiry for ADA injunction standing: (1) past injury, (2) reasonable inference of continued discrimination, and (3) reasonable inference of intent to return/use the services again. The panel also invokes Calcano’s insistence on non-vague allegations supporting intent to return. Here, Abadi’s allegations about potential future mandates and past travel plans were deemed conclusory or stale.
Pincus v. National R. Passenger Corp., 581 F. App'x 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order): Cited for the proposition that intent to return can be reasonably inferred from concrete facts like prior use, proximity, and the “distinct and widespread” nature of services. The panel contrasted that situation with Abadi’s failure to allege facts showing he planned future Greyhound travel.

A key factual pivot in the standing analysis is the court’s finding that Abadi did not allege being denied service or refused accommodation; instead, he alleged Greyhound provided instructions to request an accommodation and he chose not to pursue it. Without an alleged denial, the court treated the claimed harm as insufficiently concrete for past injury.

2) Pleading standards and pro se construction

Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2023): Cited for de novo review and the Rule 12(b)(6) requirement to accept factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.
Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024): Cited for the principle that pro se filings are construed to raise the strongest claims they suggest. Despite this solicitude, the panel found the pleaded facts still did not meet the required legal thresholds.

3) Civil-rights conspiracy under §§ 1985(3) and 1986

Gray v. Town of Darien, 927 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1991): Supplies the elements for a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim (conspiracy; discriminatory purpose; act in furtherance; injury/deprivation).
Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011): Used to reject “conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy” at the pleading stage. The panel found Abadi’s conspiracy allegations conclusory.
Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1088 (2d Cir. 1993): Establishes that a § 1986 claim must be predicated on a valid § 1985 claim, so failure of the § 1985 theory necessarily dooms § 1986.

4) Rehabilitation Act discrimination and reasonable accommodation

McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 640-41 (2d Cir. 2012): Provides the § 504 elements and explains that discrimination can include failure to make reasonable accommodations, but a public entity need not provide “every accommodation [a plaintiff] requests” or the accommodation “of his choice.” The panel relied on this principle to conclude that Greyhound’s instructions for seeking an exemption, even if not to Abadi’s liking, did not plausibly constitute disability discrimination.

5) District court decision affirmed

The panel affirmed “for substantially the reasons identified by the district court” in Abadi v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 23-cv-07645 (JLR), 2024 WL 5155601 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2024), including dismissal of NYSHRL/NYCHRL claims and timeliness dismissal of the LAD claim.

Legal Reasoning

ADA standing turned on remedy + likelihood of recurrence. Because Title III offers only injunctive relief (Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs), Abadi had to show a real prospect of future harm. The court applied Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd. to require (i) a past injury (e.g., an actual denial of service/accommodation), and (ii) plausible allegations that the challenged conduct would recur and that Abadi would likely use Greyhound again. The court found both missing: no denial was alleged, the mask mandate was no longer in effect, and future plans to ride Greyhound were not plausibly pleaded.
Conspiracy claims failed for lack of nonconclusory facts. Under Gray v. Town of Darien and Gallop v. Cheney, a plaintiff must plead more than speculation. The panel deemed Abadi’s conspiracy allegations conclusory, which necessarily eliminated § 1986 liability under Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp..
Rehabilitation Act claim failed because the alleged facts did not show exclusion “because of” disability. The panel treated Greyhound’s response—providing instructions for how to obtain an exemption—as inconsistent with an inference of discriminatory denial. Relying on McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, it emphasized that the law requires reasonable accommodation, not the plaintiff’s preferred process.
State and local claims rose or fell with the same deficiencies (and limitations periods). The court affirmed dismissal of NYSHRL/NYCHRL claims largely on the district court’s reasoning and held the LAD claim time-barred.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order signals several practical lessons likely to shape pleadings in ADA/Rehabilitation Act cases involving evolving public-health policies:

“No denial, no standing” risk in Title III injunction suits. Where a defendant offers a process to request an accommodation and the plaintiff does not pursue it, courts may find no past injury—making it difficult to establish injury in fact.
Future-injury allegations must be concrete, not speculative. Assertions that the government might reinstate a mandate were deemed conclusory; plaintiffs should allege specific facts supporting likely recurrence and personal future exposure (e.g., actual travel plans, bookings, or routine use).
Accommodation-process disputes may be framed as “choice of accommodation.” Under McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, dissatisfaction with a procedure is not necessarily discrimination if the process could lead to a reasonable accommodation.
Conspiracy claims remain tightly policed at the pleading stage. The reliance on Gallop v. Cheney underscores that civil-rights conspiracy theories require specific factual content connecting actors, agreement, and acts in furtherance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III standing: A constitutional requirement that the plaintiff show a real, personal stake in the case. For injunctions, courts require not only past harm but a real likelihood of future harm.
Injunctive relief: A court order requiring a defendant to do (or stop doing) something. Under ADA Title III, private plaintiffs generally seek injunctions, not money damages.
Reasonable accommodation: A modification that enables a person with a disability to access a service. The law generally requires a reasonable accommodation, not necessarily the one the person prefers.
Rule 12(b)(1) vs. Rule 12(b)(6): Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court’s power to hear the case (e.g., no standing). Rule 12(b)(6) argues the complaint, even if true, does not state a legally valid claim.
§ 1985(3) / § 1986: Federal civil-rights statutes addressing conspiracies to deprive equal protection and liability for failing to prevent such conspiracies. A § 1986 claim depends on a valid § 1985 claim.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Abadi v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. reinforces that ADA Title III plaintiffs must plead a concrete past denial and a plausible likelihood of future harm to obtain injunctive relief, especially when the challenged policy (here, masking requirements) is no longer in effect. It also underscores that conclusory conspiracy allegations cannot sustain §§ 1985/1986 claims, and that a Rehabilitation Act claim requires facts showing exclusion or discrimination because of disability—not merely dissatisfaction with the defendant’s accommodation procedure. Within the broader disability-rights landscape, the decision highlights the pleading and standing hurdles that can be outcome-determinative before any merits discovery occurs.